University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Law - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Business and Law

2000

The locus of decision-making authority in Circle Sentencing: the
significance of criteria and guidelines
Luke McNamara
University of Wollongong, lukem@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
McNamara, Luke: The locus of decision-making authority in Circle Sentencing: the significance of criteria
and guidelines 2000.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/8

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

The locus of decision-making authority in Circle Sentencing: the significance of
criteria and guidelines
Abstract
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administration of justice.
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THE LOCUS OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY IN CIRCLE
SENTENCING: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CRITERIA AND
GUIDELINES*
Luke McNamara**
1. INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s First Nation community participation in the form of “circle
sentencing” has emerged as a significant feature of the Canadian criminal justice
system. Circle sentencing involves the direct participation of community members in
the sentencing of the offender in a manner which combines Aboriginal and nonAboriginal processes and norms of justice. Circle sentencing had it origins in the
combined efforts of judges concerned to improve the quality of justice which the
mainstream justice system ‘delivered’ to Aboriginal communities and pressure from
communities to be allowed more input into crucial decisions affecting them. Circle
sentencing aims to reverse the colonial pattern of excluding Aboriginal people and
values from important decision-making functions with respect to the administration of
justice, and instead, invites Aboriginal communities to actively participate in
decisions related to the sentencing of criminal offenders. The practice is currently
employed in various parts of the country, and although it has been used in cases
involving non-Aboriginal offenders, it remains primarily a process adopted in cases
involving Aboriginal offenders.
This article examines the practice of circle sentencing against the background
of the continuing demand by many Aboriginal communities for greater autonomy in
relation to the administration of justice.1 The aim will be to determine the extent to
*

Research for this article was conducted with the support of a Canadian Studies Faculty Research
Award. Thanks to the Canadian High Commission (Canberra), the International Council for Canadian
Studies, and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for this financial
assistance. The Faculty Research Award allowed me to travel to Canada in May-June 1998 and
contributed toward the costs of a second visit to Canada in September-October 1998. I am grateful to
the many people who contributed to the success of these visits by sharing valuable information with
me about circle sentencing and other First Nation community justice developments. I am especially
grateful to Judge Heino Lilles, Harold Gatensby and members of the Southern Lakes Justice
Committee at Carcross, Chief Richard Sidney, Georgina Sidney and members of the Teslin Tlingit
Council, Julie Jai, Phillip Gibson, Pam Muir, Alex Dewar, Brian McGuigan, Rose Wilson, Larry
Chartrand, Romola Trebilcock, Rod Carleton, Wes Pue, Paul Chartrand, John Eaton, Ross Green,
Kearney Healy, Judge Bria Huculak, Irma Murdock, Judge Linton Smith, David Gullickson, Rick
Fowler, Tim Quigley, Darren Winegarden, Arnold Blackstar, and Bruce Archibald.
**
BA, LLB (UNSW), LLM (Manitoba). Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong,
Australia. Email: luke_mcnamara@uow.edu.au
1
This demand has been supported by a number of provincial and national inquiries. See, eg,
Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (AJIM), Volume 1: The Justice System and Aboriginal People
(Winnipeg: Province of Manitoba, 1991); Law Reform Commission of Canada (LRCC), Aboriginal
Peoples and Criminal Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for Justice (Ottawa: LRCC, 1991);
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which the practice of circle sentencing can be considered to represent a shift away
from the culturally inappropriate and unfair non-Aboriginal sentencing processes
which have historically worked to the disadvantage of Aboriginal people, in favour of
genuine respect for, and meaningful co-operation with, Aboriginal law and justice
values and processes.2 Prompted by a desire to unpack the apparent paradox of the
common characterisation of circle sentencing—a practice ostensibly developed within
judicially determined constraints—as an exercise in First Nation community-based
justice, this article is primarily concerned with examining the implications of circle
sentencing for the locus of decision-making authority in criminal cases involving
Aboriginal offenders. Specifically, it is concerned with determining whether the
practice of circle sentencing has the potential to shift the locus of decision-making
authority from judges within the criminal justice system to participants in the
sentencing circle, drawn primarily from the offender’s community. This issue will be
addressed via an examination of the rules, criteria and guidelines which have been
developed, primarily by judges, for the operation of circle sentencing.
The Canadian judiciary has exerted what might be considered a rather
paradoxical influence on the shape of circle sentencing as a vehicle for Aboriginal
community participation in the task of criminal justice administration. On the one
hand, judges have played a pivotal ‘nurturing’ role in the initiation, fostering and
development of the practice of circle sentencing. As Desjardins J of the New
Brunswick Provincial Court observed in R v Nicholas3 observed:

and Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: RCAP, 1996).
2
Circle sentencing is only one of a number of recent justice initiatives characterised by greater
participation and responsibility for First Nation communities, including Elders’ panels, family group
conferencing, and various other community mediation and diversion programs. A notable example of
the latter is the Teslin Tlingit First Nation’s Peacemaker Court, which has been established based on
the Teslin Tlingit clan system. In March 1995 Justice Canada and the Teslin Tlingit Council signed a
“Protocol for the Creation of an Alternative Justice Services Delivery Model” which allows for the
diversion of certain offences from the conventional criminal justice system to the Teslin Tlingit
Peacemaker Court. This article does not make any assumption about the relative significance of circle
sentencing when compared with these other community justice initiatives—no comparison is
attempted. It is worth noting, however, that different forms of community justice may evolve out of
experience with circle sentencing. Darren Winegarden, from the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian
Nations has observed that one of the benefits of circle sentencing for First Nation communities is that it
has opened upon possibilities for communities to identify and pursue other forms of participation in,
and responsibility for, justice administration: author interview with Darren Winegarden, Director of
Justice, Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, Saskatoon, 12 June 1998. Judge Bria Huculak has
also commented on the capacity of sentencing circles to open up a range of community-based justice
possibilities: author interview with Judge Bria Huculak, Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon,
9 June 1998. On the other hand, Larry Chartrand has warned that the criminal justice system’s
demonstrated capacity to make “allowances” for Aboriginal communities in the form circle sentencing
might be used to justify opposition to the establishment of autonomous Aboriginal justice systems on
the basis that the deficiencies of the mainstream justice system have been “fixed”: author interview
with Professor Larry Chartrand, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, 4 June 1998.
3
R v Nicholas, [1996] WCBJ LEXIS 10757 (New Brunswick Provincial Court).
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... [T]he Criminal Code makes no provision for the use of this particular type of process to
determine sentence. In fact, the Criminal Code makes no provision for any particular type of
sentencing hearing: the foundation for the conventional sentencing hearing as well as for the
use of a sentencing circle (or other alternative forms of sentencing hearing) is case law.
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On the other hand, judges have had primary responsibility for establishing, approving
and enforcing the ‘limits’ of circle sentencing by imposing tests on eligibility and
rules on process.5 This article seeks to illuminate the inquiry as to the locus of
decision-making via an analysis of the rules, criteria and guidelines which have been
developed by judges for the conduct of sentencing circles at both the entry stage of the
process—what cases are eligible for circle sentencing?—and the exit stage—what
bearing do the circle’s deliberations and recommendations have on the final
sentencing disposition?6
Section 2 provides an overview of the context of Aboriginal involvement in
the criminal justice system from which ‘alternatives’ like circle sentencing have
emerged. Section 3 maps out a theoretical framework for this article’s analysis of the
locus of decision-making authority in circle sentencing based on the insights offered
by the concept of legal pluralism. Section 4 outlines the nature of the practice of circle
sentencing, with particular emphasis on the manner in which the practice has taken
shape in the Yukon Territory and the province of Saskatchewan. Section 5 outlines
and examines the rules, criteria and guidelines that have been developed for the use of
circle sentencing. The main aim of this discussion will be to identify the respective
roles played by judges and First Nation communities in the development of these
rules and to examine the implications of these rules for the article’s primary concern
with the locus of decision-making authority. Section 6 briefly considers the
significance for circle sentencing of the addition of s 718.2(e) to the Criminal Code in
1996,7 particularly in light of the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v
Gladue.8 Section 7 summarises the article’s conclusions.
4

Ibid, para 5.
In addition appellate courts have begun to have an important impact via their handling of appeals
against sentence in cases where the sentence was determined in a sentencing circle: see Luke
McNamara, “Appellate Court Scrutiny of Circle Sentencing”, Manitoba Law Journal (forthcoming).
6
The analysis presented in this article draws on a variety of sources of written information: case
reports, government reviews, reports produced by Aboriginal community organisations and published
secondary literature. These written sources were supplemented with interviews (during May-June
1998) with a number of judges, community representatives and lawyers, involved in facilitating
sentencing circles as part of the criminal court sentencing process. In addition interviews were
conducted with representatives from Aboriginal organisations, officers from relevant territorial,
provincial and federal government departments, academics and others with knowledge and expertise
regarding the practice of circle sentencing and/or community justice generally.
7
Section 718.2(e) requires sentencing judges to taken into account, inter alia, the principle that “all
available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be
considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders”.
8
R v Gladue [1999] 1 SCR 688 (Supreme Court of Canada).
5
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One final comment is necessary by way of introduction. This article is
concerned with determining whether the practice of circle sentencing does involve a
shift in the locus of decision-making authority, rather than whether any such shift is
desirable from the point of view of the objectives of the Canadian criminal justice
system, or adequate in light of the objectives and aspirations of First Nation
communities in the area of justice administration.9 This point is worth clarifying at the
outset, so as to avoid the appearance that this article assumes that the locus of
decision-making authority is the only consideration relevant to an assessment of the
merits of circle sentencing, or that it has been prepared in ignorance of concerns
which have been raised in a variety of quarters about the practice of circle
sentencing.10 Concerns raised by critics of sentencing circles include the negative
impact of the practice on Aboriginal women (particularly where they are victims in
domestic violence and sexual assault cases), the danger of weighting the process in
favour of the offender and against the victim, the risk of local politics influencing the
process so that it benefits certain families or the local elite in a community, and
doubts about the effectiveness of circle sentencing in terms of reducing rates of crime
and recidivism. In addition, concerns have been expressed that no adequate evaluation
of circle sentencing has yet been undertaken to establish whether there is objective
evidence of the claimed benefits of the practice.11 The focus in this article on the locus
9

An evaluation of this sort would be neither appropriate nor feasible. Certainly as a non-Aboriginal
(and non-Canadian) legal academic, I am in no position to undertake any such evaluation—particularly
as I am strongly of the view (as a matter of political and legal opinion) that it is for the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada, in exercise of the collective right to self-determination, to determine the manner in
which anti-social behaviour and breaches of law are handled in their communities.
10
Despite the relative novelty of circle sentencing, there is already a substantial body of critical
literature which points to perceived weaknesses, problems or dangers in circle sentencing. See, eg,
Julian V Roberts and Carol LaPrairie, “Sentencing Circles: Some Unanswered Questions” (1996) 39
Criminal Law Quarterly 69; Carol LaPrairie, “Altering Course: New Directions in Criminal Justice –
Sentencing Circles and Family Group Conferences” (1995) The Australian and New Zealand Journal
of Criminology 78; and Carol LaPrairie, Community Justice or Just Communities? Aboriginal
Communities in Search of Justice (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1994); Mary Crnkovich, “A
Sentencing Circle” (1996) 36 Journal of Legal Pluralism 159; and Evelyn Zellerer, “CommunityBased Justice and Violence Against Women: Issues of Gender and Race” (1996) 20(2) International
Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 233.
11
Consistent with the Saskatchewan Government’s “cautiously supportive” response to the emergence
of circle sentencing (author interview with David Gullickson, Senior Policy Analyst, Policy, Planning
and Evaluation Branch, Saskatchewan Justice, Regina, 10 June 1998) the Saskatchewan Department of
Justice has indicated that the practice of circle sentencing should be submitted to thorough evaluation:
see Saskatchewan Justice, Policy, Planning and Evaluation Branch, Sentencing Circles: A Discussion
Paper (Regina, Saskatchewan Justice, June 1993). In co-operation with the Canadian Justice
Department, Saskatchewan Justice has established data collection processes to facilitate such analysis
and evaluation. See Campbell Research Associates, Sentencing Circles – A Review. Prepared for the
Aboriginal Justice Directorate, Department of Justice Canada (March 1995); and Campbell Research
Associates, Sentencing Circle Database: Data Organization and Codebook. Submitted to Aboriginal
Justice Directorate, Department of Justice Canada (June 1995). Some very preliminary evaluative data
is contained in Saskatchewan Justice, Policy, Planning and Evaluation Branch, Aboriginal Justice
Strategy: Interim Report, February 1998 (Regina, Saskatchewan Justice, 1998) (discussed further
below). Bazemore and Griffiths have noted that while evaluation of community justice programs like
circle sentencing is desirable it is necessary to recognise that “Many restorative and community justice
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of decision-making authority has been adopted with an awareness that this represents
but one of the considerations relevant to any evaluation of the merits of circle
sentencing.

2. BACKGROUND: LAW REFORM RESPONSES TO ABORIGINAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXPERIENCES
It is an undeniable reality that Aboriginal people suffer disproportionately at the hands
of the dominant criminal justice system in post-colonial settler societies such as
Canada. A great deal of energy has been invested during the last decade in confirming
the facts of Aboriginal over-representation, disadvantage and injustice, and in
proposing ‘solutions’ to these problems.
A recurring theme of many of the major public inquiries undertaken during
this time (such as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in Canada12) has been
the identification of a causal relationship between the specific forms of injustice
suffered by Aboriginal people at the hands of the dominant criminal justice system
and the more general subordination of Indigenous peoples’ legal authority that
characterised the colonial process and which continues to define European/Indigenous
relations in post-colonial settler states. That is, the suppression of Aboriginal laws and

initiatives have objectives that are far more holistic than traditional crime control responses which have
typically utilized recidivism rates as a primary outcome measure. An evaluative framework for these
approaches would, therefore, have to include measurable criteria to assess outcomes of ‘community
empowerment and solidarity’, ‘victim interests’ and ‘crime prevention’”: Gordon Bazemore and Curt
Taylor Griffiths, “Conferences, Circle, Boards & Mediations: Scouting the ‘New Wave’ of Community
Justice Decisionmaking Approaches” (1997) [www.cjprimer.com/circles.htm]. See also Judge Barry
Stuart, “Circle Sentencing in Yukon Territory, Canada: A Partnership of the Community and the
Criminal Justice System” (1996) 20 International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminology
291 at 293-294. Scepticism on the part of circle sentencing practitioners (including some judges) as to
whether government-sponsored evaluation will adequately take these factors into account has
contributed to a reluctance to support government evaluation projects. Bazemore and Griffiths also
stress that the effectiveness of community justice initiatives must be compared with “the reality of the
current system rather than an idealized version of its performance”: ibid. Judge Heino Lilles, one of the
leading judicial proponents of circle sentencing, has similarly observed that the ‘success’ of circle
sentencing must be measured against the demonstrated failure of the conventional criminal justice
system to deliver justice and reduce crime, particularly in Aboriginal communities: author interview
with Judge Heino Lilles, Territorial Court of Yukon, Whitehorse, 25 May 1998; see also Heino Lilles,
“A Plea for More Humane Values In Our Justice System” (1992) 17 Queen’s LJ 328; and Heino Lilles,
“Dawn or Dusk in Sentencing”, paper presented at the Canadian Institute for the Administration of
Justice Conference, Montreal, 24-26 April 1997. Judge Bria Huculak has also argued that measures of
success must be appropriate and realistic. On the question of recidivism rates Judge Huculak has
pointed out that it is important to focus not simply on whether individuals reoffend, but whether they
commit offences of the same type and seriousness: author interview with Judge Bria Huculak,
Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, 9 June 1998.
12
RCAP, op cit.
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the denial of Aboriginal self-determination underpins contemporary problems of
Aboriginal recidivism and over-representation in the criminal justice system.13
The identification and exploration of this relationship has underpinned the
articulation of an approach to justice reform which eschews the conventional and
inherently limited strategy of merely ‘tinkering’ with, or ‘fine-tuning’ the dominant
principles and institutions of the prevailing (central) regime of non-Aboriginal
criminal law.14 Instead, genuine improvement in the ways in which Aboriginal people
‘experience’ justice is seen to be contingent on a reshaping of the framework for the
resolution of disputes and the maintenance of social order—a reconfiguration of the
acceptable parameters of legitimate social control mechanisms which leaves room for
the operation of Aboriginal laws and values, which is consistent with the exercise of
Aboriginal self-determination, and which demonstrates a commitment to pluralist
justice.
Practical change along these lines has been slow and limited. Moreover,
justice reform based on (varying degrees of) recognition of Aboriginal laws and
processes have tended to occur alongside, rather than as a result of, the concerted
efforts of law reform inquiries such as have been conducted by the Law Reform
Commission of Canada15 the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba16 and the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.17 That is, the implementation of processes which
acknowledge the legitimacy and relevance of Aboriginal laws, justice values and
processes in criminal cases involving Aboriginal defendants has frequently been an ad
hoc judicial response, in co-operation with particular First Nation communities rather
than a deliberate course of progressive law reform embarked upon by legislatures or
executive governments.18 This is true of circle sentencing. This point is worth making
13

In Australia, the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody reached a similar conclusion.
See Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1991).
14
Luke McNamara, Aboriginal Peoples, the Administration of Justice, and the Autonomy Agenda: An
Assessment of the Status of Criminal Justice Reform in Canada With Reference to the Prairie Region.
Research Report No. 4 (Winnipeg: Legal Research Institute of the University of Manitoba, 1993).
15
LRCC, op cit.
16
AJIM, op cit.
17
RCAP, op cit.
18
There are exceptions to this general pattern. For example, in the Yukon the Canadian Justice
Department (in co-operation with the Yukon Justice Department) is currently negotiating with
interested First Nations over the devolution of responsibility for justice administration in the context of
the settlement of comprehensive land and self-government claims. One such First Nation is the Teslin
Tlingit First Nation. In May 1993 tripartite agreement was reached on land (Teslin Tlingit Council
Final Agreement (Ottawa, DIAND, 1993)) and self-government (The Teslin Tlingit Council SelfGovernment Agreement (Ottawa: DIAND, 1993)). Section 13.3.17 of the Self-Government Agreement
provides that “The Teslin Tlingit Council shall have the power to enact laws … in relation to the …
administration of justice”. This power will be exercisable commencing in the year 2000. In June 1997
negotiations commenced over the terms of the devolution of responsibility for justice administration,
and in April 1998 a Framework Agreement on the Process to Negotiate Teslin Tlingit Council Justice
Agreements was completed. The objectives of the Teslin Tlingit Council, as outlined in the framework
agreement, include the establishment of a Teslin Tlingit Council Court which will incrementally
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at the outset because it does indicate that there is frequently considerable distance
between the agenda and mechanics of ‘mainstream’ law reform on the one hand, and
on the other, the means by which actual change occurs—particularly in the area of
community justice.

3. LEGAL PLURALISM: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
EXAMINING ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY JUSTICE

FOR

In the context of examinations of the experience of Indigenous peoples under the legal
and governmental systems of post-colonial settler states, the term ‘legal pluralism’ is
commonly used to denote a desired (or less commonly, achieved) state of affairs
characterised by a ‘fair and just’ relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
legal systems rather than continuation of the colonial pattern of subordination of
Indigenous legal cultures.19 What this brief account of the significance of the term
‘legal pluralism’ does not reveal is that the concept of legal pluralism is controversial
and contested—it is a concept which provokes strong reaction on the part of both
adherents and critics. Therefore, before considering the utility of the concept as a
framework for examining the practice of Aboriginal community based justice in the
form of circle sentencing, further consideration of the concept of legal pluralism is
necessary.
Divergent views as to the utility of the concept reflect, in part, different
definitions of the term, and the manner in which the concept has evolved. While it
would be simplistic to reduce the debate to a disagreement over semantics, any
consideration of the concept of legal pluralism must begin with the fundamental and
complex question of definition.
The concept of legal pluralism has been variously explained in the literature.
Manderson has succinctly stated that “In its simplest form, legal pluralism posits that
20
more than one legal order inhabits the same physical territory”. According to Merry
legal pluralism is “generally defined as a situation in which two or more legal systems
coexist in the same social field. ... Recent work defines ‘legal system’ broadly to
include the system of courts and judges supported by the state as well as nonlegal
forms of normative ordering. ... Thus, virtually every society is legally plural.”21 In a
similar vein Griffiths has observed that “Legal pluralism is an attribute of a social
assume responsibility for justice administration functions within the jurisdiction of the Teslin Tlingit
Council.
19
See RCAP, op cit, 233.
20
Desmond Manderson, “Beyond the Provincial: Space, Aesthetics, and Modernist Legal Theory”
(1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 1048 at 1059.
21
Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism” (1988) Law and Society Review 869 at 871.
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field and not of ‘law’ or of a ‘legal system’. ... It is when in a social field more than
one source of ‘law’, more than one ‘legal order’, is observable, that the social order of
that field can be said to exhibit legal pluralism. ... [L]egal pluralism is a universal
feature of social organization.”22 Sack offers the important additional insights that
“Legal pluralism is more than the acceptance of a plurality of law; it sees this plurality
as a positive force to be utilised—and controlled—rather than eliminated. Legal
pluralism thus involves an ideological commitment.”23
Critiques of the concept of legal pluralism (both sympathetic and hostile) have
come from a variety of perspectives. For example, Tamanaha has argued that “the
concept of legal pluralism is constructed upon an unstable analytical foundation
which will ultimately lead to its demise.”24 Specifically, Tamanaha takes issue with
what he characterises as the “threshold flaw” of legal pluralism: the core notion that
the “legal system” includes “non-legal forms of normative ordering.”25 For Tamanaha
“so generous a view of what law is”26 is unacceptable because the term “‘law’ thereby
lose[s] any distinctive meaning.”27 Put simply, Tamanaha’s criticism of legal
pluralism reflects his view that the term ‘law’ should only be used to refer to state
law, not non-state normative orders. Even if this critique is meritorious in particular
contexts (eg Tamanaha uses the extreme example of “table manners” as a set of rules
which should not be described as ‘law’) it by no means follows that the rules and
social values of Aboriginal peoples cannot accurately and appropriately be described
as ‘law’. Tamanaha’s approach carries a great risk of perpetuating the colonial
ideology and practices which saw Aboriginal legal systems denigrated and
subordinated as (at best) ‘lore’ and ‘custom’.
From a very different perspective Maori lawyer Moana Jackson has criticised
the concept of legal pluralism on the basis that it “is inherently assimilative and
racist.”28 In particular Jackson is critical of the belated, selective and carefully
circumscribed manner in which laws, values and rights of Indigenous peoples have
been acknowledged by the colonising state under the guise of ‘legal pluralism’ so that
colonial domination is continued rather than rejected via the state’s formal embrace of
legal pluralism.29 Arguably, Jackson’s concerns about legal pluralism relate less to its
22

John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1 at 38.
Peter Sack, “Legal Pluralism: Introductory Comments” in Peter Sack and Elizabeth Minchin (eds),
Legal Pluralism: Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII (Canberra: Law Department,
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1988), 1.
24
Brian Tamanaha, “The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism” (1993) 20(2)
Journal of Law and Society 192.
25
Ibid, 193 quoting Merry, op cit, 870 (emphasis added by Tamanaha).
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Moana Jackson, “Changing Realities: Unchanging Truths” (1994) 10 Australian Journal of Law and
Society 115 at 116.
29
Ibid.
23
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utility as a concept for exploring and investigating the existence of a range of
normative orders within a society (including Indigenous legal systems) than to the
appropriation of the language of ‘legal pluralism’ by post-colonial states as a vehicle
for continuing the colonial project of marginalisation and subordination of Indigenous
peoples’ legal values, rules and institutions.
What these various formulations of (and judgements on) the concept of legal
pluralism reveal is a diversity of opinions on both the nature and value of the concept.
Does it refer to the political aspirations of oppressed minorities, and in particular
Indigenous peoples who have suffered under colonisation? Does it merely refer to the
multiplicity of normative orders in any society? If so, is it simply an empirical label,
without political significance? Or does the ideology of opposition to ‘legal centrism’
have practical implications for law and law reform? Is it a rhetorical (and frequently
misleading) assertion on the part of the state about the capacity of the dominant legal
system to deliver justice to minority groups? Is it a ‘vehicle’ for the continuation of
the colonial project?
The answer for present purposes—that is, the relationship between Aboriginal
law and processes and state criminal law and processes in Canada—is that the term
legal pluralism is of some relevance in all these respects. But this does not sufficiently
address the divergence in meaning. To this end, regard must be had to the evolution of
the concept of legal pluralism in legal anthropology. As Merry has observed:
The intellectual odyssey of the concept of legal pluralism moves from the discovery of
indigenous forms of law among remote African villagers and New Guinea tribesmen to
debates concerning the pluralistic qualities of law under advanced capitalism. In the last
decade, the concept of legal pluralism has been applied to the study of social and legal
ordering in urban industrial societies, primarily the United States, Britain, and France. Indeed,
given a sufficiently broad definition of the term legal system, virtually every society is legally
plural, whether or not it has a colonial past. Legal pluralism is a central theme in the
reconceptualization of the law/society relation.

30

Within this process of evolution and development, Merry identifies two phases
of legal pluralism. The first, “classic legal pluralism”, was concerned with “the
analysis of the intersections of indigenous and European law” in colonial and postcolonial contexts. The second, “new legal pluralism”, espouses that “plural normative
orders are found in virtually all societies”.31

30
31

Merry, op cit, 869; see also Manderson, op cit, 1059.
Merry, op cit, 872.
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Upon this classic/new paradigm it is possible to superimpose a distinction that
has been drawn between the “juristic” view of legal pluralism and the “social science”
view of legal pluralism. The former is said to be concerned with the particular terms
of the formal relationship (that is, as reflected in the state legal system) between
Indigenous law and the imposed law of the coloniser. The latter is a descriptive theory
for identifying an empirical state of affairs.
For Griffiths the former is, at best, only a ‘weak’ version of legal pluralism,
because it offers no challenge to the ideology of “legal centralism”. By contrast the
“social science” version of legal pluralism is legal pluralism in the ‘strong’ sense. It
aims to
break the stranglehold of the idea that what law is, is a single, unified and exclusive
hierarchical normative ordering depending from the power of the state, and of the illusion that
the legal world actually looks the way such a conception requires it to look.

32

Given its association with what leading scholars of legal pluralism have
characterised as the ‘classic’ and ‘weak’ notion of legal pluralism (with implications
of inferiority, irrelevance and anachronism) it is perhaps not surprisingly that the
question of the status of the laws and legal systems of Indigenous peoples within postcolonial states is presently a somewhat unfashionable focus for analyses from the
perspective of contemporary legal pluralism. This is unfortunate for two reasons.
First, even if, for the sake of argument, the ascendancy of the social science
view of legal pluralism is conceded, Indigenous peoples and their normative orders
are not thereby disqualified as appropriate fields of inquiry for proponents of this
‘new’ legal pluralism. Aboriginal law (encompassing both substantive rules as well as
processes) is a matter of empirical reality for First Nation peoples in Canada,
irrespective of whether the relevant state legal system can be said to be pluralist in the
juristic sense. Therefore, the nature of contemporary Aboriginal law and its
relationship with other forms of law (including state criminal law) need not be
considered ‘off-limits’ by those concerned with legal pluralism in the ‘strong sense’.
Second, the rise of ‘new’ legal pluralism need not signal the complete demise
of its ‘classic’ equivalent. While it may be fair to say that “legal pluralism goes far
deeper than the joining of European and traditional forms of law”33 it by no means
follows that legal pluralism has outgrown its utility as a concept for exploring the
Indigenous/coloniser relationship. Indeed, there are good reasons why, particularly in
relation to analyses of contemporary struggles by Indigenous people over law and

32
33

Griffiths, op cit, 4-5.
Merry, op cit, 870.
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justice issues, the nexus between classic/new, juristic/social science, and weak/strong
should not be severed. For example, the concept of legal pluralism in the juristic sense
highlights the reality of state power and coercion, which underscored the
Indigenous/coloniser relationship and which continues to underscore the
Indigenous/post-colonial state relationship. As Manderson has observed, “The first
stage of ‘modern pluralism’ [ie Merry’s classic legal pluralism] was motivated by a
clear political agenda ... Whether in colonial societies, Brazil or the inner city,
‘pluralism’ stood for resistance to the established legal order”.34 The social science
version of legal pluralism tends to underemphasise this factor—deliberately, it would
seem, but nonetheless problematically.35 As Alan Hunt has observed, while it is
important to “recognize the diversity of legal phenomena and avoid falling into the
presumption of a unitary entity ‘the Law’”, it is also important “to give due
recognition to the importance of both the state as a political agency and to state-law.”36
More specifically Hunt has emphasised the need to “address the specific articulation
between state-law and non-state law”.37
Given the concerns of this article—the relationship between state criminal
laws and processes, and the criminal laws and processes of First Nations, with specific
reference to the practice of circle sentencing—it seems necessary and appropriate to
consider the utility of the concept of legal pluralism in two senses. First, the concept
of legal pluralism is useful as a social descriptor—for identifying and highlighting the
multiplicities of laws/normative orders operating in a given context. Second, legal
pluralism has value as a legal ‘barometer’—for characterising the relationship
between Indigenous laws and state laws, so that it is possible to speak of the presence
or absence of legal pluralism (in lesser or greater degrees) in any given state’s legal
system, or specifically, system of criminal justice administration.
Utilisation of the concept in both these respects has important benefits from
the point of view of facilitating a constructive analysis of community justice
initiatives such as circle sentencing: the versions can be mutually compatible rather
than contradictory or mutually exclusive. For example, as a social descriptor, legal
pluralism is a valuable tool for breaking down the law/lore distinction which has
hindered acceptance of the authenticity and legitimacy of Indigenous laws and justice
processes. As a legal barometer, legal pluralism arguably offers greater political
currency in that it constitutes a measure for assessing the capacity of existing legal
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regimes to deliver justice to Indigenous people, using criteria including the degree of
compatibility with Indigenous laws and processes.
Of course, in suggesting that legal pluralism can be used as a measure of
‘justice’ for Indigenous people, including in the context of criminal law, it will be
crucial what criteria are employed in any such assessment. Williams has noted that “a
facade of legal pluralism may conceal a reality of monocultural legal domination” and
issued “a warning for scholars to be cautious in their analysis of attempts by a modern
state legal system to operate in a pluralistic manner.38 Mindful of this warning, this
article will utilise the concept of legal pluralism as an analytical perspective from
which to examine the practice of circle sentencing.
At first glance, the concept of legal pluralism and the practice of circle
sentencing may not appear to have much in common. One might ask, ‘surely a
practice which is only concerned with determining the sentence for a criminal offence
and not liability for the criminal offence, and where the judge retains ultimate
decision-making authority, can’t be considered an illustration of legal pluralism’. This
may be a reasonable conclusion but it is an unsatisfactory presumption or starting
point. This article aims to closely and critically examine the rules which have been
developed to ‘shape’ the practice of circle sentencing, in order to establish a
foundation for answering a key question: to what extent does circle sentencing
involve a significant shift in the site of decision-making authority out of the hands of
judges and the mainstream criminal justice system, and into the hands of First Nation
communities. This task is undertaken will full recognition of the inherent paradox of
reform strategies which attempt to recognise Aboriginal authority over law and justice
matters within the parameters of the non-Aboriginal legal system. A detailed
understanding of the terms of the resulting compromise is necessary in order to
evaluate the significance of the emergence of circle sentencing as an established
feature of the Canadian criminal justice system.

4. THE ORIGINS AND CURRENT PRACTICE OF CIRCLE SENTENCING
In its 1996 report on the criminal justice system, Bridging the Cultural Divide, the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples simply but accurately described circle
sentencing as a meeting where “individuals are invited to sit in a circle with the
accused and discuss together what sentences should be imposed”.39 This description
38
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effectively conveys the ‘bare bones’ of what happens in sentencing circles, but of
course it does not reveal the considerable variations—court to court, community to
community, and case to case—in the forms of the practice of circle sentencing which
have been employed in many communities across Canada in recent years. In a similar
vein, the purpose of the overview of the origins and practice of circle sentencing
which is offered in this section of the article is not to provide a comprehensive
account of how circle sentencing works,40 but to establish a basis for consideration of
particular aspects of the process of circle sentencing in the remainder of this article.
By necessity then, the account of circle sentencing will be generalised in nature.
The recent origins of the practice of circle sentencing can be found in the
Yukon where it was initiated in 1992 by Judge Barry Stuart of the Yukon Territorial
Court in co-operation with a number of First Nation communities across the
territory.41 The motivation for Stuart J (and subsequently other judges in the territory,
including Judge Heino Lilles) and members of First Nation communities deciding to
look for alternatives was simple: overwhelming evidence that the conventional
criminal justice process was failing, nowhere more dismally than in those First Nation
communities ‘serviced’ by circuit courts. As Stuart J observed in R v Moses42 — the
first circle sentencing convened in the Canadian criminal justice system and the
prototypes on which many sentencing circles across the country have been modelled
— “no one can contend ‘circuit court’s work’; no one can deny that the system
squanders money and lives unnecessarily with dubious success in either protecting or
improving the community.”43
The sentencing circle format, then, was developed as an alternative to the
conventional (and demonstrably ineffective) sentencing hearing where the judge, after
hearing submissions from Crown and defence counsel and considering reports and/or
testimony from relevant experts and other interested parties, makes a decision on
his/her own and imposes a sentence on the offender. Participants in a sentencing circle
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usually include the offender, the judge,44 the victim, the prosecutor and the
defendant’s lawyer, along with a cross-section of the community (including family
members of the offender and the victim). The objective of the process is to allow for
direct community involvement in the sentencing process, with a view to arriving at an
appropriate sentence, which reflects, where achieved, the consensus view of the circle.
While circle sentencing involves a conscious departure from a number of the
practices which define the conventional style of sentencing, it remains, formally and
legally, a sentencing hearing within the court system. Consequently, certain
procedures are retained, including the receipt and marking as exhibits of criminal
record documentation or other reports, the recording or proceedings, the judicial
determination of disputed facts “in the usual manner through evidence heard under
oath” and the openness of the proceedings to the public.45
Consistent with the consultative and community-based nature of the process,
circle sentencing necessitates a physical rearrangement of the court room. In Moses,
Stuart J explained the rationale for altering the physical layout of the courtroom:
In any decision-making process, power, control, the over-all atmosphere and dynamics are
significantly influenced by the physical setting, and especially by the places accorded to
participants. … In the criminal justice process … the physical arrangement in a court-room
profoundly affects who participates and how they participate. The organization of the courtroom influences the content, scope and importance of information provided to the court. The
rules governing the court hearing reinforce the allocation of power and influence fostered by
the physical setting. The combined effect of the rules and the court-room arrangements
entrench the adversarial nature of the process. The judge, defence and Crown counsel,
fortified by their prominent places in the court-room and by the rules, own and control the
process and no one in the court-room can have any doubt about that.

46

Of course, the departure from the conventional sentencing hearing which
circle sentencing represents involves more than merely altering the seating
arrangements, but according to Stuart J this simple change was the catalyst for a
significant change in the sentencing decision-making process. Stuart J explained that,
in Moses, when the physical arrangement of the courtroom was altered so that all
participants were sitting “in a circle without desks or tables … the dynamics of the
decision-making process were profoundly changed.”47
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Word of this new approach to doing justice in First Nation communities soon
spread, to other parts of the Yukon and to other provinces. Harold Gatensby, member
of the Carcross Tagish First Nation’s Justice Committee,48 has explained that when
Judge Stuart suggested that circle sentencing be conducted in the Carcross community
there was immediate enthusiasm for the idea and a desire to start immediately, such
was the extent of the community’s need.49 Gatensby has stated:
People ask, “How do you get started? We don’t have the funding. We don’t have the
resources. What do you do?” What we did in our community was we put all the chairs in a
circle and sat down. That is all. And it works.

50

Apart from the Yukon Territory, the jurisdiction in which circle sentencing has
been most widely used is the province of Saskatchewan. The first Saskatchewan
sentencing circle was held in July 1992 in the community of Sandy Bay in a case in
the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan presided over by Fafard J.51 Fafard J made the
initial suggestion, which was supported by members of the community.52 Fafard J has
reported that he first heard of Stuart J’s use of circle sentencing via a newspaper
account of the Moses case and “The idea appealed to me right off the bat”.53
One of the community participants in the first circle held at Sandy Bay has
explained the approach adopted at the inception of circle sentencing:
Well, we just kind of played it by ear. There was no set guidelines or nothing. We just said
“Okay, we’ll deal with him, [the offender].” ... [We got] a good mix of people, some young,
middle-aged, elders, the RCMP, the magistrate [judge], ... the accused and his family. And we
just hacked it out ... But, instead of looking at punishing the guy, we looked at what’s causing
him to do these things.
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The practice of circle sentencing (in a variety of forms) has since been adopted
and adapted by criminal courts and Aboriginal communities in many parts of the
country, and has been described by the Chief Justice of the Saskatchewan Court of
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Appeal as “part of the fabric of our system of criminal justice and ... a recognized and
accepted procedure”.55
In Moses Stuart J identified a number of benefits of circle sentencing as a mode
of decision-making,56 including that it:
•
challenges the monopoly of professionals;
•
enhances the range and quality of information on which a sentencing decision
can be made;
•
increases the likelihood that creation sentencing options will be identified;
•
promotes shared responsibility for the making and implementation of
sentencing decisions;
•
encourages offender and victim participation in the sentencing decision;
•
facilitates improved understanding of the limitations of the conventional justice
system;
•
broadens the conventional criminal justice system’s narrow focus on the
conduct of the offender;
•
encourages identification of productive ways to use community resources; and
•
involves greater recognition of Aboriginal cultures and values.
This final benefit identified by Stuart J is of particular relevance here given that this
article is concerned with examining circle sentencing through the lens of legal
pluralism. In Moses Stuart J explained this benefit of circle sentencing as follows:
Aboriginal culture does not place as high a premium on individual responsibility or approach
conflict in the direct confrontational manner championed by our adversarial process.
Aboriginal people see value in avoiding confrontation and in refraining from speaking
publicly against each other. In dealing with conflict, emphasis is placed on reconciliation, the
restoration of harmony and the removal of underlying pressures generating conflict. … The
circle contributes the basis for developing a genuine partnership between aboriginal
communities and the justice system by according the flexibility for both sets of values to
influence the decision-making process in sentencing.

57

The choice of the circle as the conceptual, physical and procedural framework for the
reworking of criminal justice administration by circuit courts in the Yukon was not
accidental. That the circle carries philosophical, spiritual and cultural significance for
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many First Nations in Canada is widely recognised. What has been more controversial
is whether the circle sentencing is appropriately seen as a product of First Nations’
legal cultures based on ‘traditional’ methods of dispute resolution and decisionmaking in Aboriginal communities, or alternatively, whether circle sentencing is more
accurately characterised as the creation of a progressive minority within the Canadian
judiciary? In a political context where sentencing circles have been depicted by some
critics as a ‘soft option’ designed to allow Aboriginal offenders to ‘get off easy’,58
questions about the ‘cultural authenticity’ of circle sentencing have implications
beyond the issue of anthropological accuracy.
A number of commentators have emphasised the connections between First
Nations’ cultures and circle sentencing. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples described the introduction of circle sentencing as “a decision to return, in a
fashion, to the way justice was done before the arrival of the non-Aboriginal legal
system. The return to more traditional approaches [has] led to an opening up of the
sentencing process to greater community input”.59 Similarly, Tim Quigley has
described sentencing circles as an example of “the rejuvenation of procedures and, to
some extent, dispositions traditionally practised by some Aboriginal Peoples in this
country”.60 Larry Chartrand has explained, that “the very purpose of the circle
sentencing process … is to have the aboriginal community regain a measure of control
over the justice system in a manner more conducive to its traditional methods of
dispute resolution.”61 More cautiously, Curt Taylor Griffiths has noted, “Restorative
justice initiatives in Aboriginal communities [such as circle sentencing] may be, but
are not necessarily, premised on customary law and traditional practices”.62
On the other hand, Carol LaPrairie, a prominent critic of sentencing circles,
has argued that sentencing circles are “not aboriginal-community driven but the
58
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innovation of certain reform-minded judges.”63 This criticism assumes, rather
simplistically, that judicial initiation is necessarily inconsistent with community
ownership. The example of the development of circle sentencing in the Carcross First
Nation, discussed above, illustrates that this need not be so. Of course, it is crucial, as
Harold Gatensby has noted,64 that community justice initiatives such as circle
sentencing be based in the community. However, the mere fact that a particular
initiative develops out of the suggestion of a judge is hardly an insurmountable barrier
to this occurring. What is crucial is whether the community is receptive to the
suggestion and how the project subsequently takes shape. As Judge Heino Lilles has
observed, with reference to the importance of community ownership, “it is imperative
that those individuals involved in initiating the project give up control, share credit
with others and constantly reinforce the initiative as one belonging to and involving
the whole community”. 65
Other commentators have questioned the ready assumption that communitybased justice initiatives are necessarily a product of an Aboriginal people’s culture.
For example, Mary Crnkovich has observed, with specific reference to the Inuit of
northern Québec:
There appears to be some confusion between Inuit-based and community-based justice
initiatives. The fact that Inuit are the majority within the community does not necessarily
make a community-based initiative an Inuit-based initiative. In fact very few of the
community-based initiatives are rooted in Inuit tradition. Adult diversion and circle
sentencing are not Inuit traditions. For alternatives to be Inuit-based, Inuit must be allowed to
design and implement them. Those within the justice system who endorse alternatives must be
willing to allow their models to be reconstructed to reflect Inuit values and traditions.

66

Certainly, the point that it is important to avoid any tendency towards
overgeneralisation and homogenisation when considering distinctive and diverse
Aboriginal legal cultures is well made. However, it is equally clear that a number of
First Nations do see circle sentencing as having its origins in their culture. For
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example, in R v C (LM)67 the mediator of the circle, Morris Little Wolf from the
Peigan band, testified that the process had been used for over 500 years.68
Judicial opinions on the topic vary considerably, even amongst strong
advocates and active proponents of circle sentencing. For example, Judge Bria
Huculak, one of the Provincial Court judges heavily involved in the development of
circle sentencing in northern Saskatchewan, has stated that “the use of sentencing
circles in Saskatchewan was primarily a judicial initiative, in that the judges
encouraged, promoted and developed the procedural framework for the process.”69
Judge Linton Smith, also of the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, has argued, based
on his experience with First Nation communities in the southern part of the province,
that there is a significant relationship between circles and Aboriginal culture and has
emphasised the spiritual dimension of the process of circle sentencing.70
Despite such differences of opinion, it if fair to say that a significant number
of judges in various parts of the country have (at a minimum) effectively taken
‘judicial notice’ of the origins of circle sentencing in First Nations’ legal cultures. For
example, in R v Morin Bayda CJ emphasised the long history and cultural origins of
circle sentencing:
The sentencing circle has its genesis in the healing circle which from time immemorial has
been a part of the culture of many First Nations of Canada and of the indigenous peoples of
other countries. … The circle was premised on two fundamental notions: first, the wrongful
act was a breach of the relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim and a breach of the
relationship between the wrongdoer and the community; and second, the well-being of the
community and consequently the protection of its members and the society generally
depended not upon retribution or punishment of the wrongdoer, but upon “healing” the
breaches of the two relationships. The emphasis was primarily, if not entirely, upon a
restorative justice or healing approach as distinct from a retributive or punitive approach.
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Similarly, in R v Rich (No 1)72 O’Regan J in the Newfoundland Supreme Court
observed that “The concept of ‘sentencing circles’ is new and innovative for the
courts. The concept, however, has been traditionally used by Aboriginal and Native
people throughout the country.”73
For Judge Barry Stuart sentencing circles are best seen as a ‘hybrid’ born of
co-operation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal legal cultures:
The partnerships formed with Yukon Community Peacemaking and Sentencing Circles draw
heavily upon Aboriginal concepts of peacemaking and the practices typically found in
mediation and consensus-building processes. Community Circles are neither wholly western,
nor Aboriginal, but combine principles and practices from both in creating a communitybased process to respond to conflict in a manner that advances the well-being of individuals,
families and the community.

74

Ultimately attempts to ‘locate’ sentencing circles within or without
‘traditional’ Aboriginal cultures miss the point. A much more relevant and
constructive line of inquiry is to explore the nature and extent of the embrace and
ownership of this (and other) alternative justice processes by contemporary First
Nation communities. From this point of view, comments such as the following, from
Harold Gatensby of the Carcross Tagish First Nation, are telling: “This sentencing
75
circle is our people’s way.” Such comments confirm that the appropriate questions as
to the relationship between circle sentencing and Aboriginal cultures should be about
acceptance and compatibility rather than authenticity.76
On the question of compatibility, one of the points which has been made on
numerous occasions is that circle sentencing places a greater emphasis on restorative
justice rather than the retributivist approach of conventional sentencing, and that this
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emphasis is characteristic of Aboriginal conceptions of justice.77 As Fafard J observed
in R v Joseyounen:
The aim of sentencing circles is the same as it is when the disposition is arrived at by other
means: the protection of society by curtailing the commission of the crime by the offenders
and others. However, in sentencing circles the emphasis is less on deterrence and more on reintegration into society, rehabilitation, and a restoration of harmony within the community.

78

Fafard J observed that such an approach to dispute resolution and sanctioning of antisocial behaviour was more compatible with Aboriginal conceptions of justice and
traditional methods of dispute resolution.79
It is important to recognise, however, that not all so-called ‘restorative justice’
approaches are necessarily applicable to a particular First Nation community merely
because they are considered to have their origins in an Indigenous culture. The recent
case of R v McKay80 provides a good illustration of the dangers of over-generalisation,
homogenisation and essentialisation in the context of reforms aimed at the
incorporation of Aboriginal peoples’ values and processes into the criminal justice
system.
In the reported judgement in McKay Reilly J, in the Alberta Provincial Court
observed, in a way reminiscent of many judges who have become involved in
Aboriginal community justice that based on a realisation that “justice will work better
for the aboriginal when they participate in the process” the judge decided to
“encourage the use of Aboriginal Sentencing Circles”.81 However, rather than engage
in the discussions with community representatives which have commonly preceded
the implementation of circle sentencing in other locations, to this end, Reilly J
attended a presentation on Family Group Conferencing by John McDonald and David
Moore of Transformative Justice Australia82 and arranged for training to be conducted
in the First Nation communities where he sat as a circuit court judge. In McKay Reilly
J observed that while the case itself was unremarkable, “[t]he manner in which the
accused is being sentenced is remarkable because it is the first time in this jurisdiction
that I have used the process known as Family Group Conferencing.”83
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Undoubtedly, there may be merit in Canadian ‘borrowing’ from Antipodean law
reform initiatives and proposals (and vice versa). However, there is something curious
and troubling about the story of a judge who, convinced of the value of First Nation
community participation in justice administration on the Cochrane Reserve, Alberta
(in the form of circle sentencing) adopted in pursuit of this objective a set of
principles and processes (namely, ‘Family Group Conferencing’ (FGC)) developed by
two non-Aboriginal Australian academics/entrepreneurs, and purportedly based on the
traditional justice methods of the Maori of Aoteroa/New Zealand. Reilly J claims
“that in trying to make better justice for the aboriginal, I have learned something from
the aboriginal that may improve justice for all.”84 However, the adoption of the FGC
model for implementation in a First Nation community in Alberta appears to have
been based on what Cunneen has described in the Australian context as
the spurious assumption that there are homologous social structures among Indigenous
cultures. In other words, Indigenous people all over the world are seen as the same. Family
group conferencing grew out of Maori traditions; Maori people are Indigenous; therefore all
Indigenous people will benefit from family group conferencing. Ultimately such a view is
racist, ascribing as it does some essentialist core to what it is to be authentically ‘Indigenous’
85

without cultural, spatial or temporal difference.

A number of commentators have expressed similar concerns with respect to the
adoption of Family Group Conferencing in Canada. For example, Juan Tauri has
expressed concern
that the imported family group conferencing forum (from New Zealand) is being forced upon
Canadian First Nations at the expense of their own, and more appropriate, justice mechanisms
... Neither Federal nor Provincial governments in Canada should imagine that just because
family group conferencing is supposedly based on indigenous (i.e., Maori) justice processes,
that it is therefore appropriate for indigenes residing in their borders.
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Gloria Lee has observed:
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With all due respect to the Maori people who have generously shared their knowledge and
teachings with the government of their land in the hopes of benefiting the Maori youth—and
with kind thanks to the government of Canada and the justice departments for their
thoughtfulness—the First Nations people of North America, since time immemorial, have had
and still do have principles and processes in place to deal with disharmony within the
community much in the same way the Maori of New Zealand have. I am not sure whom that
surprises, but it needs to be pointed out.
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Of course, it is importance to recognise that particular First Nation
communities in Canada may choose to adopt the FGC model or some other form of
community-based or restorative justice not obviously or directly sourced in their own
traditional culture. To suggest that such a choice was improper would be inconsistent
with a recognition of the crucial need for Aboriginal self-determination in the area of
justice administration. However, if FGC is promoted as the ‘preferred’ model of
restorative justice—with implications for the availability of government funding and
judicial support—then there is a danger of foreclosing the option of utilising
traditional justice mechanisms, which may or may not resemble the FGC process.88
In addition to a focus on restoration rather than retribution, one of the major
points of departure between conventional approaches to sentencing in the Canadian
justice system and circle sentencing is that the latter process is predicated on
meaningful community participation in, and responsibility for, the process and the
outcome. In R v Webb,89 in which the first sentencing circle was conducted at the
Kwanlin Dun First Nation in Whitehorse, Stuart J observed that
While sentencing circles in each community are significantly different in many respects,
common to all circles is the opportunity for the community to participate and assume
responsibility. The circle setting continues to forge new partnerships between the justice
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system and the community, and provides a positive working environment for developing a
common desire to explore new avenues for sharing responsibility.

90

In light of this objective it is important to see the procedure of circle sentencing in
broader terms than simply the meeting ‘without desks and tables’ which is substituted
for a conventional sentencing hearing. While this is the defining ‘event’ of circle
sentencing, its effectiveness depends heavily on preparation and follow-up. Many
First Nation communities have now established justice committees which are
responsible for overseeing the circle sentencing process from the screening and
preparation of offenders seeking to have their cases determined in a sentencing circle,
through facilitation of the main sentencing circle meeting (or series of meetings),
including appointment of the ‘Keeper of the Circle’, up to the implementation of the
sentencing plan agreed to by the circle and approved by the judge.
That circle sentencing constitutes more than just a one-off meeting in the
space usually filled by the sentencing hearing is well illustrated by the case of R v
Lucas.91 In this case the Court was not advised until the commencement of the
scheduled hearing that the accused wanted to have his sentence determined in a
sentencing circle. The Crown did not support the holding of a circle, and so what
followed was, in the words of Hudson J, “not a sentencing circle in the cultural sense
that has been adopted in other courts”.92 Instead, the judge organised the sentencing
hearing as follows:
All persons who were present and were thought to be importance by the accused and his
counsel were heard. They were sworn at once and sat as a group and shared each other’s
company while testifying. Each was able to defer to another in answering the questions.
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Hudson J explained that sentencing circles “are achieved by some preparation and the
agreement of the prosecuting authorities, which was not the case here.”94
Given that one of the primary motivations for the initiation of circle
sentencing was that it would beneficial to involve the community in the decision90
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making process, it is important to consider how the ‘community’ is defined, and by
whom the community is represented (that is, who participates in the circle, or how the
participants are selected).
On the question of how community is defined, Stuart J has emphasised that “A
community is not a place, it is people.”95 It follows that while the practice of circle
sentencing has been primarily developed and used in First Nation reserve
communities that are relatively distinct in geographic, social and cultural terms, circle
sentencing need not be limited to such settings. For example, in R v SEH96 the
offender, an Aboriginal man living in Vancouver, requested circle sentencing.
Stromberg-Stein J acknowledged that “The constitution of the circle posed a challenge
insofar as defining a circle of peers within an urban setting.97 However, a circle was
convened, “composed of dedicated leaders of the native community in the Lower
Mainland representing many different interests and people from all walks of life.”98
Similarly, in considering a request for a sentencing circle from an Aboriginal man
living in Saskatoon, Grotsky J in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench stated in
R v Cheekinew99 that in the context of determining the existence of an appropriate
community for the purpose of circle sentencing, “the term ‘community’ ought to
receive a wide and liberal construction as the term ‘community’ may be, and probably
is, a term capable of different interpretations depending on the residence … of the
particular offender …”100
The availability of a community for the purpose of circle sentencing involves
more than just being able to define the existence of a group, whether geographically
or personally. Community capacity, willingness and preparedness to participate in
criminal justice decision-making (and to oversee follow up) is a prerequisite for the
success of community-based justice whether in the form of circle sentencing or
otherwise. In its 1992 decision in R v Brown101 the Alberta Court of Appeal observed
that
Whether changes in the justice system may be made in the future to accommodate the special
needs of aboriginal communities, it is beyond the ability of a trial court or an appellate court
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to consider some modification of sentencing principles in a particular case unless there is
evidence before the court that the accused’s community is ready, willing and able to
undertake some process which will enhance the possibility of rehabilitation and set an
example which will deter other members of the community from similar conduct.
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Similarly, Bayda CJ noted in R v Morin that the “capacity of each of these participants
[offender, victim and community] to participate in a way that is likely to result in a
restoration or healing” is important.103 In R v Cheekinew Grotsky J specifically
identified “the nature of an offender’s community, and its willingness to participate in
the sentencing process” as “factors which … will … be relevant to the determination
of whether a sentencing circle ought to be established.”104
In terms of which members of the community are represented on the
sentencing circle the basic principle is that everyone is eligible and welcome to attend,
and that the community takes primary responsibility for ensuring that there is
appropriate representation amongst the participation. Commonly the community’s
justice committee will facilitate this process. In addition a number of judges have
required evidence that the circle is representative and not ‘partisan’ before approving
the holding of a sentencing circle. In R v Naappaluk105 Dutil J expressed the view that
circles
must always be made up of people who take a great deal of interest in the welfare of the
community. These people must also be representative of the community itself, to whose
opinion they give voice. Traditionally, Elders made important decisions. There should always
be a place for them at those sittings. The victim should also be heard.
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In R v Joseyounen, Fafard J identified as one of the criterion for the holding of a
sentencing circle that “There are elders or respected non-political community leaders
willing to participate”.107 In R v Alaku Dutil J bluntly expressed another of the
concerns that has prompted judicial oversight of the composition of circles: “It must
be clear that the circle members are not individuals in the pay of any accused
attempting to fool the court with regard to his sincerity.”108
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In the context of an examination of the extent to which circle sentencing
represents a shift in the locus of decision-making authority in the criminal justice
system, the spectre of judicial scrutiny of the composition of the circle is obviously
significant. It raises the more general question of what rules have been established by
the courts for the operation of circle sentencing, and what impact these rules have on
the capacity of circle sentencing to achieve the goal of reconfiguring the decisionmaking process in a manner which allows for meaningful community participation. It
is to an explanation and analysis of this matter that the next section of this article is
directed.

5. JUDICIAL RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF CIRCLE SENTENCING
In the previous section it was noted that the implementation of circle sentencing as a
component of the Canadian criminal justice system has been motivated, at least in
part, by a genuine recognition of the legitimacy, relevance and value of Aboriginal
law and justice processes, cultural values and perspectives (including the authority of
Aboriginal Elders). Yet, it is important to realise that this gesture of recognition and
accommodation takes place within substantial constraints established by the
mainstream justice system. The most obvious limitations are that the community does
not participate in the determination of guilt or innocence, but only in the choice of
sentence once guilt is established, and that the judge rather than the First Nation
community is formally responsible for the ultimate decision as to sentence. Bazemore
and Griffiths have observed that “courts and other agencies in Canadian communities
experimenting with circle sentencing have experienced ongoing tension over the
extent to which power sharing with the community should be limited ….”109
This section of the article review the rules, guidelines and criteria which have
been developed by judges involved in the initiation of circle sentencing in their
respective jurisdictions. While a number of the cases discussed come from the Yukon
and Saskatchewan, cases from other jurisdictions will also be discussed, so as to
obtain a fuller picture of the way in which circle sentencing has been ‘shaped’ by
judicial oversight across the country, to illustrate divergent approaches, and because
there is, as in many areas of laws, considerable cross-jurisdictional ‘borrowing’ when
it comes to rules for circle sentencing.
While the focus of this section is on the role of judges in setting the limits of
circle sentencing it is important to recognise that the process of rule-setting is not an
entirely unilateral process. It is important not to overstate the degree to which judges
109
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alone determine the eligibility and procedural rules for circle sentencing. To do so
would be to risk misconceiving the co-operative and collaborative nature of the
exercise. First Nation communities have played an important role in ‘creating’ the
practice of circle sentencing in terms suitable to their particular community. More
specifically, community representatives (commonly in the form of a justice
committee) frequently play a key role in determining which sorts of cases will be
dealt with by way of circle sentencing, and whether a circle sentencing hearing is
appropriate in a given case. For example, in R v Johnstone110 the defendant requested
that he be sentenced by sentencing circle on a number of charges of which the most
serious was possession of narcotics for the purpose of possession under s 4(2) of the
Narcotics Control Act. Lilles J observed that “initially, the [Kwanlin Dun] Justice
Committee did not accept Mr Johnstone for a sentencing circle, because he was a not
a long-time member of that community and because they felt uncomfortable dealing
with a drug offence.”111 However, the defendant regularly attended meetings of the
Justice Committee over an eight month period prior to sentencing and at his
sentencing hearing a number of people from the Justice Committee and the
community spoke or made submissions on his behalf.
More generally, justice committees have participated in the development of
guidelines and establishing processes for making decisions about eligibility. For
example, the Justice Committee of the Kwanlin Dun First Nation has explained their
process in the following way:
Kwanlin Dun Circle Court deals primarily with sentencing where a guilty plea has been
entered. Offenders wishing their cases heard in the Circle are now required to complete an
Application and develop an action plan (with the assistance of a support worker), which is
reviewed by the Justice Committee.

When the offender meets with the Justice Committee, they will be encouraged to provide
information about where they are on their healing path. They are also encouraged to bring
people in the community who are willing to support them and who believe they are motivated
to make changes in their life.

The victim will be contacted to discuss the crime, any support or resources they need, how
they feel about the offender applying for circle sentencing, and whether they would like to be
part of the process. This information is discussed with the Justice Steering Committee.
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Based on the information provided by the offender (particularly what steps they have taken on
their action plan), their support worker, and the victim, the Justice Committee Steering
Committee and Elders will make a decision about approving the application.
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In some cases, formal protocols have been developed between First Nation
communities and justice departments, specifically to achieve greater clarity as to
when Crown prosecutors would be prepared to support the holding of a sentencing
circle. An example is the Protocol of the Katapamisuak Society at the Poundmaker
Cree Nation in Saskatchewan.113 Whether in the form of guidelines by First Nation
justice committees or as protocols between First Nation communities and relevant
government departments, these rule are not developed independently of the rules
developed by judges,114 so that an understanding of the latter remains crucial to a valid
analysis of the operation of circle sentencing.
Roberts and LaPrairie have observed that “judicial discretion is critical at two
stage of the process: at the beginning, when the judge agrees to conduct the circle and,
at the conclusion, when the judge accepts, rejects or modifies the recommendation of
the circle.”115 The current section will consider the rules that judges have developed to
guide the exercise of their discretion at both points.
5.1 Eligibility for Circle Sentencing
One of the first reported cases to attempt to expressly state criteria for the use of
sentencing circles was R v Cheekinew in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench.
In Cheekinew the starting point adopted by Grotsky J was that “not every convicted
person is entitled ipso facto to an order for the creation of a sentencing circle.”116 In
addition to consideration of the “nature of the offender’s community” (discussed
earlier), Grotsky J held that eligibility for a prison sentence of less than two years (and
therefore eligibility for a probation order) was a pre-condition for the establishment of
a sentencing circle.117 In addition Grotsky J ruled that he was
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not … satisfied that the offender is genuinely interested in any help from his Saskatoon
community … In my view he sees what is now proposed on his behalf as merely a means of
attempting to avoid that which is now justly due to him. As well, I am not satisfied, even if
given the opportunity so to do, that if he has a “community” in Saskatoon, that his community
will be able, even if willing to do so, as was the situation in the Moses case, to properly
control and supervise him.
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In summary, Grotsky J proposed the following non-exhaustive list of
eligibility criteria for the holding of a sentencing circle:
a) If the trial judge is … of the view that the offender must receive a punitive term of
imprisonment of two years or more, then … a submission should not … be heard for the
establishment of a sentencing or like circle.
b) [The offender should be] genuinely contrite …
c) [The offender should be] supported in the request for the establishment of a sentencing
circle by the offender’s own community willing to participate in the sentencing circle process
and to make meaningful sentencing recommendations … [and] to assume responsibility for
the supervision and enforcement of the terms of the probation order including the reporting of
any breach …
d) [The offender should be] a person honestly interested in turning his or her life around with
the assistance and supervision of his or her ‘community’.
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In R v Alaku Dutil J identified what he considered to be (and what have
become widely regarded as) two essential criteria in deciding whether a sentencing
circle should be held in a given case. First, “[t]he accused must have the firm and
clear intention to rehabilitate himself and become a good citizen.”120 Second, there
must be sufficient desire on the part of the community “to become involved for the
sake of one of its members.”121 In additional Dutil J identified a number of relevant
“factors” that the court should consider. For example, was the crime one of serious
violence or sexual assault?122 If so circle sentencing would generally be inappropriate.
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Did the offender plead guilty or was he found guilty by trial?123 Dutil J considered that
while this was a relevant consideration (i.e. denial by the offender would not usually
be compatible with the sentiments necessary for the holding of a circle) a guilty plea
should not be treated in all cases as a pre-condition to eligibility for circle sentencing.
Is the victim prepared to participate in the circle?124 While Dutil J considered victim
participation in the circle to be highly desirable he did not appear to consider it
essential, and stressed that the victim should not be pressured into participating.125 Are
the community participants in the circle capable of playing the role that is required of
them, and there for the purpose of representing the community rather than simply as
partial advocates for the offender?126
In R v Rich (No 1) O’Regan J in the Newfoundland Supreme Court was asked
to rule on the offender’s application for a sentencing circle. The application was
opposed by the Crown in light of “1. The nature of the offence; 2, the fact that the
complainant does not wish to participate; and 3. The range of sentence.”127
O’Regan J quoted with apparent approval the criteria adopted by Grotsky J in
Cheekinew, and added that in cases such as the one before him “the participation of
the victim is an important consideration.”128 Indeed, for O’Regan J the nonparticipation of the victim was determinative:
Without the complainant a large slice of the circle is missing. I find that a sentencing circle
certainly requires four integral parts:
1. the judge;
2. the accused;
3. the complainant (if there is one); and
4. the community.

Others may be added but these are the very foundation.
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Of particular concern to O’Regan J was that a judge’s participation in a circle which
did not include the victim might compromise judicial independence by creating the
appearance that the judge was favouring the offender’s interests over those of the
accused.130 Having rejected the offender’s application for a sentencing circle O’Regan
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J noted that he still wanted community input into the sentencing decision and
proposed a number of ways to achieve this, including, “hearing the results of the
consensus of the community from their own sentencing circle with the accused and
without the complainant and the judge.”131
When the same matter returned to O’Regan J for sentencing,132 the judge took
the opportunity to make some further comments about the factors relevant to a
determination as to whether the court should approve a sentencing circle. In particular
O’Regan J considered the relevance of the seriousness of the offence:
I find that “sentencing circles” will be most useful in minor offences. It is my view that only
in very rare cases will a victim in a serious charge be willing to confront the accused in a
“sentencing circle” … I should add that in a serious charge where a complainant appears
willing to participate in a sentencing circle the presiding judge should carefully inquire that
the complainant is genuine in the desire to attend and is not in any way being pressured to do
so by others. If it becomes obvious that the complainant is testifying at the request of others
and not on his or her own behalf then the perception could be clearly left that the circle is for
the benefit of the accused. The circle, like a judge, must clearly be independent and to be
perceived otherwise is fatal to the sentencing process.
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It is not entirely clear what O’Regan J intended by the requirement that circle
be ‘independent’. Presumably, and reasonably, the expectation is that participants
must not be biased in favour of the offender and against the victim. But independence
may also be considered to connote a more general detachment or objectivity which is
in many ways the antithesis of how circle sentencing is designed to operate as a
mechanism of community justice. One of the advantages of circle sentencing (when
compared with the conventional court process and circuit courts in particular) is that
the participants do know and have ongoing relationships with the offender (and
usually with the victim). Circle sentencing is predicated on valuing and utilising these
connections in making an appropriate sentencing decision and in increasing the
likelihood that the offender will successfully complete his/her sentence.
In R v Joseyounen Fafard J of the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan and one
of the judicial pioneers of the use of sentencing circles in the north of the province
stressed the importance of criteria: “In deciding whether or not to hold a sentencing
circle the court is exercising a judicial function. That means that the decision must not
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be made arbitrarily, it must be made with reference to certain criteria.”134 Fafard J
explained that seven criteria had been adopted by judges of the Provincial Court of
Saskatchewan in the north for “deciding if a case for sentencing should go to a
circle.”135 The criteria had been developed over a period of time, originally by
“researching the materials and decisions coming out of the Yukon, particularly the
decision of Judge Barry Stuart of the Yukon Territorial Court in R v Moses”, and
since July 1992 when the first sentencing circle in the province was initiated by
Fafard J, based on his experience and that of his judicial colleagues, and by
community consultation,136 as sentencing circles “came into existence in different
northern communities.”137
The seven criteria, as outlined by Fafard J in Joseyounen are:
1. The accused must agree to be referred to the sentencing circle.
2. The accused must have deep roots in the community in which the circle is held and from
which the participants are drawn.
3. There are elders or respected non-political community leaders willing to participate.
4. The victim is willing to participate and has been subjected to no coercion or pressure in so
agreeing.
5. The court should try to determine beforehand, as best it can, if the victim is subject to
battered woman’s syndrome. If she is, then she should have counselling and be accompanied
by a support team in the circle.
6. Disputed facts have been resolved in advance.
7. The case is one in which a court would be willing to a take a calculated risk and depart
from the usual range of sentencing.
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Fafard J noted that “These criteria are not carved in stone, but they provide guidelines
sufficiently simple for the lay public to understand, and are also capable of application
so that our decisions are not being made arbitrarily.”139 Fafard J indicated that a
judge’s decision as to whether a request for a sentencing circle should be granted
involves two steps. First, an application of the criteria to the facts of the case. Second,
if the criteria are not satisfied, an inquiry as to whether “there [is] still good reason to
hold a sentencing circle.”140
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In the case at hand Fafard J ruled that the seventh criterion was not satisfied—
a penitentiary term was unavoidable—and therefore the application for a sentencing
circle was refused. Instead Fafard J agreed to the holding of a “healing circle” which
the family of the offender had requested “‘as a way of healing and insuring that
something like this does not happen again’”.141 Fafard J indicated that he would not
determine the length of the offender’s prison sentence until after the healing circle had
met because his decision “may be impacted by the discussion in the circle.”142
To date, appellate courts have declined to impose binding rules on lower
courts, but have strongly recommended that clear eligibility criteria be established.143
In R v Johns Prowse JA in the Yukon Territorial Court of Appeal discussed, with
implicit approval, the criteria outlined by Fafard J in Joseyounen, and in R v Morin,
the majority of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal implicitly approved the Joseyounen
criteria and those utilised by Grotsky J in Cheekinew. In addition, the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal endorsed the limitation that a sentencing circle should not be held
unless the minimum sentence which could be handed down involved less than two
years imprisonment.144
In contrast, the Chief Justice of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has
disapproved of fixed eligibility criteria, preferring, in Morin, to identify just “two
mandatory criteria: … the willingness of the offender and the existence and
willingness of a community.”145 Bayda CJ has elaborated on these two criteria by
stating that a judge should not direct the holding of a sentencing circle unless/he is
satisfied that:
1. There exists a community with the following attributes:
(i)

the community is reasonably well defined by reason of the racial origin of its
members, their religion or culture or by geography or some other feature which
distinguishes the community from other communities;
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(ii)

the community recognizes the accused not only as a member but as one who has the
kind of relationship with the community that ought to make him or her feel
accountable to it for any criminal wrongdoing;

(iii)

the community supports the accused in his or difficulty with the law and is prepared
to accept the accused as a person who has the capacity, inclination, need and the
sincerity to be restored (healed) in his or her relationship with the community and in
his or her relationship with the victims of the wrongdoing;

(iv)

the community has sufficient healing or restorative resources to help the accused
(and where necessary the other persons affected by the wrongdoing) in that
restoration or healing.

2. The accused:
(i)

considers himself or herself a member of the community and as one who has the kind
of relationship with it that makes him or her feel accountable to it for the
wrongdoing;

(ii)

has the capacity, inclination, need and the sincerity to be restored (healed) in his or
her relationship with the community and with the victims of the wrongdoing;

(iii)

has taken full responsibility for the wrongdoing;

(iv)

has pleaded guilty or in some other acceptable way has demonstrated the attributes
described in (ii) and (iii);

(v)

is prepared to accept and carry out the decision of the community acting through its
representatives at the sentencing circle respecting the measures the community
deems appropriate for the restoration or healing.
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According to Bayda CJ where these two pre-requisites are satisfied, the judge should
not automatically approve an application for a sentencing circle, but should first
“consider all of the other factors that bear upon the issue”,147 including the seriousness
of the offence and the victim’s willingness to participate. The Chief Justice did not
support a two year imprisonment limit148 and did not consider victim participation to
be mandatory in all cases.149 Significantly, Bayda CJ’s position on the two year limit
was adopted by a majority of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R v Taylor.150
In R v Manyfingers Jacobsen J of the Alberta Provincial Court was prompted
to consider at length the question of appropriate criteria and procedures for the use of
circle sentencing because the sentence recommended by the sentencing circle
represented “a departure from the sentencing guidelines for domestic violence
146

Morin, op cit, 69-70.
Ibid, 70.
148
Ibid 73.
149
Ibid 73-74.
150
R v Taylor (1997), 122 CCC (3d) 376 at 399-400 per Bayda CJ.
147

36
established by the Alberta Court of Appeal.”151 The offender had pleaded guilty to a
charge of aggravated assault (on her husband) under s 267(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
The offender was accepted into the Blood Indian Reserve’s Aisiimohki alternative
sentencing program, the outcome of which was a recommendation for a non-custodial
sentence. The Crown and defence counsel agreed with the recommendation.
Jacobsen J stated that “certain procedures, standards and guidelines must be
established” in the interests of “uniformity of approach” (as opposed to “uniformity of
sentence”). 152 Taking as the starting point what were described as “[t]he criteria
approved in Johns”153 (as well, in the context of the facts of Manyfingers, the
principles of sentencing in domestic violence stated by the Alberta Court of Appeal in
Brown154) Jacobsen J suggested a 15 point list of guidelines for the conduct of circle
sentencing.
1. The sentencing circle can exist separately and independent of the judicial system if the
participants so desire. And if so, the sentencing circle’s proper recommendations, if made in a
timely fashion, can still be considered by the Court.

2. The application to the panel should be made as soon as possible after the offence has been
committed, and time permitting, the sentencing circle process should be underway even
before the first court appearance. This may allow for alternative measures pursuant to s 717
[of the Criminal Code]. In any event the factors outlined in s 717 are relevant to the
sentencing circle process.

3. [There] must be a prompt plea of guilty, not only as a meaningful expression of remorse
and for sparing the victim, but also, to promote expeditious justice. Such a plea clearly
ensures “timeliness” in the traditional way to promote healing. This acceptance of
responsibility is also necessary to determine, resolve and agree upon all relevant facts.

4. Both the victim and the community must also be willing and effective participants.

5. The principles and objectives of the sentencing circle should be well formulated, perhaps
with a standard preamble for each report. This will assist all segments of society to better
understand and appreciate the process. Although the sentencing principles and general
objectives shouldn’t change, the specific objectives having regard to the actual circumstances
of each case will vary.
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6. The standards of the report must be extremely high to bring credit to, and enhance the
integrity and reputation of the process and of the members of the sentencing circle, and to be
seen as much by the public and by the accused.

7. The report should be prepared and submitted in a timely fashion. The format and certainly
the information should be similar to that found in the standard Probation Pre-Disposition or
Pre-Sentence Report but must go further to ensure that there is meaningful input from the
offender’s community to “ensure a more realistic evaluation of the offender’s situation”.

8. All participants in the sentencing circles should be fully identified by name, address, status,
occupation and speciality or category role in the circle (eg mediator), specific expertise, and
relationship, if any to the victim or accused. Aboriginal leaders must have adequate cultural
awareness and appreciation …

9. All participants should be made aware of the legal process, sentencing principles, and
sentencing alternatives, in order to weigh and make knowledgeable decisions. They should
consult with Crown counsel, but particularly with corrections and community supervision
staff involved in sentencing matters who have expertise ‘in identifying sentences that work’.
… Applicable historical aboriginal precedents, principles and background, if relevant, should
be included.

10. Community assessment, including observation and reports on the conduct of the accused,
should commence before the court confirms the use of the sentencing circle, form part of the
discussion, be referred to in the report and continue to date of sentencing …

11. [The report should] outline all of the factors considered, the cultural foundation; the pros
and cons of each course open to the circle, the victim, the community and to the offender; the
analysis; and finally, the recommendation based on unanimity. Alcohol and substance abuse
factors must be considered in detail.

12. The report should be so comprehensive that rarely, if ever, will it be necessary that the
mediator or case manager be called to give evidence. …

13. Recommendations must have legal and cultural validity and must be realistic having
regard to:

(a) available resources,
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(b) the nature and character of the offender,
(c) the nature and needs of those most closely in contact with the offender, and
(d) the concerns and needs of society.

14. The assessment and report must be completed promptly, but allow reasonable time, when
appropriate, for the individual to attend and complete relevant assessment and initial
counselling. The may require special applications for adjournments. It is preferable, however,
that prompt disposition take priority. Completion of special programs are best imposed as
conditions to be complied within a probation order or conditional sentence order.

15. Sentencing must not be delayed.
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This is a detailed and onerous set of guidelines. In large part these attributes would
appear to be a consequence of the particular model of circle sentencing in relation to
which they have been formulated—a model under which there is considerable
distance between the judge and the circle. In contrast to the models of circle
sentencing which have developed in many Yukon and Saskatchewan communities,
judicial participation is absent and direct judge/community co-operation with respect
to the sentencing decision appears limited in the sentencing scheme for which
Jacobsen J has produced guidelines. That is, Jacobsen J appears to have been
concerned with regulating what is, in effect, a very different process than that which is
commonly described as “circle sentencing” — at least as this term has commonly
been employed with respect to the practices that have developed in the Yukon and
Saskatchewan. Consequently the Manyfingers guidelines for sentencing circles are
different in form and purpose from the guidelines developed in other cases (such as
Joseyounen) which have primarily been concerned with the issue of eligibility—that
is, which cases are suitable to be handled by way of sentencing circle.
Further evidence of an ‘independent’ model of circle sentencing, is found in
the case of R v H,156 also a decision of the Alberta Provincial Court. In R v H Marshall
J declined to accept the non-custodial sentence recommendation of a Native
Sentencing Circle which had been facilitated by the Edmonton Native Youth Justice
Committee. While expressing appreciation for the Circle’s input (and shaping a post157
release probation order which incorporated most of the Circle’s recommendations, )
Marshall J concluded that the seriousness of the offence required a prison term. In
addition to the demands of the facts of the case, Marshall J’s rejection of the Circle’s
recommendation appears to have been prompted also by general unease about the lack
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of clear rules and guidelines for the operation of circle sentencing,158 and a specific
concern that in the case at hand the circle had demonstrated “minimal” concern for the
nine-year old sexual assault victim.
Not only does Manyfingers impose onerous obligations on First Nation
communities who wish to develop circle sentencing, but nowhere in Jacobsen J’s
judgement is there any indication as the status of the recommendations contained in a
circle sentencing report. Clearly, it is anticipated that sentencing would take the
recommendation into account in handing down sentence, but given the comprehensive
nature of the guidelines for the conduct of sentencing circles, First Nation
communities might reasonably expected some sort of assurance that sentencing circle
recommendations that emerge from a process that complies with the 15 point
checklist proposed in Manyfingers will not lightly be ignored by sentencing judges.
Such an assurance might be considered to be implicit in the manner in which the
judge has presented the guidelines, but an express assurance (qualified, if deemed
necessary by the customary reminder that the ultimate decision-making authority
remains with the judge) would have gone some way towards dispelling the impression
left by Jacobsen J’s judgement in Manyfingers of a significant degree of ambivalence
and scepticism about the benefits, integrity and practicality of circle sentencing.159
While sentencing circles of the sort utilised in Manyfingers and HR would
appear to enjoy greater independence and autonomy from the conventional court
system, in effect, the converse may be true. The primary themes of the guidelines
developed by Jacobsen CJ in Manyfingers are accountability and efficiency, which in
turn reflect a degree of underlying scepticism about what is actually going on in circle
sentencing processes. These themes are perhaps most obviously reflected in Jacobsen
J’s stringent requirements as to the contents of the written report to be produced by
the circle. The perceived need for stringent guidelines arises, it would seem, in large
part because of the judge’s non-participation in the process.160 Therefore, the level of
judicial oversight may be greater, and the weight afforded to circle recommendations
(representing, effectively, a community-based pre-sentence report) may be less where
the sentencing circle operates at a distance from the judge and the sentencing court.
Of course, consistent with their right to self-determination First Nation
communities are entitled to choose the method of participation in the sentencing
process that it is appropriate and acceptable to the community. The adoption of an
independent and ‘at arms length’ model of circle sentencing may reflect such a choice.
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But from the point of view of this article’s primary concern—whether circle
sentencing represents a significant shift in the locus of decision-making authority in
the criminal justice system—such forms of community participation need to be
distinguished from the community/judge/court co-operative process which the term
circle sentencing is commonly used to denote.
The case of R v Sellon161 from the Newfoundland Supreme Court provides a
good illustration of the distinction. The offender was a non-Aboriginal man who was
raised and lived in the Innu community of Sheshashit, Labrador. In O’Regan J’s
judgement, the offender was described as someone who “from an early age …
developed a close relationship with the Innu culture and people which still exists
today.”162 The offender pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual assault on a 13 year old
girl. Initially the offender applied to be sentenced by sentencing circle. The Crown
opposed this application and subsequently the application was withdrawn. As an
alternative, the offender participated in what the judge subsequently described as “an
informal ‘healing circle’ outside the courtroom setting and in the community of
Sheshashit.”163 When advised of the offender’s plan to pursue this option O’Regan J
… indicated to both counsel that if they wished to attend the ‘healing circle’ they could do so
and I would place what I deem to be the appropriate weight to the results of the ‘healing
circle’ after I had received the results.
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A report of the healing circle prepared by two of the participants was submitted to
O’Regan J. The report note that this was the first time that the proceedings of a
healing circle in Sheshashit had been reported to a judge to be taken into account in
determining a sentence.165 On the distinction between a sentencing circle and a healing
circle the report contains the following statement:
We … made a deliberate decision that it was not suitable or accurate to call this planned circle
a ‘sentencing’ circle. Sentencing is a justice system process to be done in court by court
participants and the judge. This circle would be held as a circle of concern and support for
[the victim and the offender]. Included in the circle as part of the process would be
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recommendations made by the participants which would be shared with the courts to be used
by the Judge as he saw fit.
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O’Regan J accepted the recommendation of the healing circle and handed down a
non-custodial sentence.167
In contrast to the comprehensive guidelines recommended by Jacobsen J in
Manyfingers, a number of judges directly involved in circle sentencing have
questioned the need for, or appropriateness of, rigid ‘guidelines’. For example, in R v
Nicholas Desjardins J of the New Brunswick Provincial Court stated:
... I will not set out any criteria or guidelines for accepting or rejecting an application. Each
case is different and each case must be looked at individually. I will, however, suggest that
there are three integral elements to the composition of the sentencing circle: the judge, the
accused and the community.
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In R v CP169 Lilles J observed that criteria of the type adopted by Fafard J in
Joseyounen may be appropriate “where the purpose of the circle sentencing hearing is
to develop an alternative sentence”.170 However:
Sometimes, but not always, a circle sentencing hearing results in the development of a
community based alternative sentence. In other instances, it results in a disposition which
involves incarceration within a range that could have been expected in ordinary court.
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Lilles J observed that in calling for guidelines and criteria in all circle sentencing
cases, Courts of Appeal, including the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R v Morin,
have failed to “distinguish between the procedural aspects of holding a circle
sentencing hearing, and the imposition of an alternative sentence.”172 Lilles J argues
that while strict guidelines might be appropriate in cases where the charges are very
serious and the purpose of the circle is to determine an alternative sentence, the same
criteria may not be appropriate where the purpose and effect of the circle is to
facilitate community participation in the decision-making process. In such cases,
Lilles J has elsewhere stated (in the case of Gingell) that the court’s basic eligibility
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requirements should be that the offender must: “fully accept responsibility” for his/her
crime; have “significant support from the community, friends, or family”; and fulfil
the requirements of the application process as prescribed by his/her community’s
justice committee.173 Stuart J, also of the Yukon Territorial Court, has similarly
resisted the pressure for judicial imposition of strict eligibility criteria, preferring to
see this task as a community responsibility.174 According to Stuart J:
Communities do not rejects cases on the basis of the crime committed. Minor offences such as
drinking underage to serious, indictable offences including manslaughter and sexual assaults
have been heard in Circle Sentencing. The connection of the offender to the community, the
sincerity and nature of offender’s efforts to be healed, the input of victims and the dedication
of the offender’s support group primarily determine whether the case will be accepted into the
Circle.
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Underlying Lilles J’s criticism in CP of appellate court calls for firm criteria
appears to be a consciousness of a common misconception about the purpose of
sentencing circles—that they are designed to result in alternative sentences and avoid
incarceration.176 While overwhelming evidence of the high levels of Aboriginal overrepresentation in prisons and concern about the limited value and impact of
incarceration were important motivations for the initiation of the practice of circle
sentencing, alternative sentencing is not the raison d’etre of circle sentencing (or as
Fafard J expressed the same point in R v Joseyounen: “keeping people out of jail is
not the aim of this exercise. If that were the only goal, one need only open the jails
and release all Aboriginal inmates immediately”177).
Avoiding incarceration may be a desirable outcome of a sentencing circle in a
particular case but it is not necessarily the primary purpose for the use of the circle.
One of the most important benefits of circle sentencing is that, irrespective of what
sentence is handed down at the end of the day, to a considerable extent the offender is
sentenced by his/her community. As Lilles J noted in CP, one of the advantages of
circle sentencing is that
Offender participation is increased and the impact of the sentencing hearing will be more
meaningful to him or her. It is one thing to be “condemned” by a faceless judge, quite another
to be told by members of one’s family and friends that certain conduct is unacceptable and
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will not be tolerated. As Judge Stuart stated in Moses: “Punishment, if required, can be
imposed in a circle as readily as in a courtroom. There is a significantly different sting to a
punishment imposed by a community, than to a similar sentence imposed by a circuit court
judge. Punished by a community, the offender must face his sentence daily.”
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In R v CP the offender was sentenced to nine months imprisonment (in
addition to two months of pre-trial custody) and two years probation for a conviction
of assault causing bodily harm under s 267(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. CP had
proposed as an alternative to a prison term, a sentencing plan which would included a
curfew, abstention from alcohol, 300 hours of community service and a long
probation period. However, it appears that this plan did not attract wide support in the
circle. Lilles J stated that “After hearing everyone who spoke on this matter and the
concerns that were expressed, I am not going to accept that alternative. It is very clear
to me that there must be a period of incarceration.”179
It is difficult to generalise as to what the prevailing judicial rules, criteria and
guidelines tells us about the locus of decision-making authority in cases where
sentencing circles are convened, because there has been considerable variation in how
these rules have been formulated by judges in different parts of the country. Certainly
it is not possible to identify one set of uniform rules, although there is a considerable
degree of common ground, centred on the two mandatory criteria endorsed by Bayda
CJ in R v Morin.
Eligibility criteria of the type endorsed in Saskatchewan are suggestive of a
tight judicial reign on the terms of community participation in the sentencing
decision,180 particularly when compared with the approach adopted by judges in the
Yukon, where there has been minimal formulation of judicial rules and a strong
emphasis on community rule-setting. However, on closer inspection, it appears that
even relatively detailed criteria—such as those adopted in Joseyounen—do not
necessarily significantly constrain the capacity of First Nation communities to
178
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participate in sentencing decision-making. Certainly the suggestion by Roberts and
LaPrairie that “The number of cases that will meet … [the] criteria will not be great
and the impact upon admissions will consequently be derisory”,181 appears to overstate
the likely impact of existing judicial rules and criteria. In Joseyounen Fafard J noted
that the criteria “are not carved in stone”182 and subsequent decisions have emphasised
the character of the criteria as guidelines rather than mandatory requirements.
Attempts to impose a non-negotiable limit based on the seriousness of the offence (via
the ‘two years imprisonment’ threshold) appear, in light of the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal decision in Taylor, to have failed. Finally, this article has not attempted to
address the level of compliance with judicial criteria where they are ostensibly ‘in
force’. Certainly this is one area in which reliable quantitative research would be
valuable, in order to accurately determine the practical impact of rules, guidelines and
criteria on the sentencing circle decision-making process.183

181

Roberts and LaPrairie, op cit, 79. Despite their criticism of what they see as the restrictive nature of
judicial criteria, Roberts and LaPrairie certainly do not advocate the relaxation of existing criteria.
They argue that “if the criteria for inclusion in a circle are relaxed, and many cases are sentenced in
this way, all hope of consistency of treatment and equity in sentencing can be abandoned”: ibid, 80.
The presentation of these parallel arguments without any genuine attempt to find a compromise reflects
a general tone of hostility towards sentencing circles that pervades this article by Roberts and
LaPrairie. These commentators are, of course, entitled to be critical of sentencing circles, and may well
argue that their obvious cynicism about, and opposition to, the practice represents an attempt to
balance what they see as the exaggerated claims of proponents of circle sentencing. However, the
overtly hostile tone of the critic does not sit well with the authors’ own statement of purpose – “The
purpose of this article is not to evaluate sentencing circles … but instead to raise a number of issues
that need to be addressed”: ibid, 69. It appears that Roberts and LaPrairie were well aware of the harsh
and potentially controversial nature of their critique. At the beginning of the article Roberts and
LaPrairie offer the following qualification: “the primary focus of this article is the utility of sentencing
circles to the non-aboriginal culture; their application to the area of aboriginal justice raises separate
issues that cannot be fully explored in this article” (70). This is a curious and rather disingenuous
‘positioning’ given that that, to date, the practice of circle sentencing has been adopted almost
exclusively in cases involving Aboriginal offenders, a fact which would have been well known to the
authors. One wonders whether this ‘disclaimer’ was designed to take some of the political sting out of
the author’s negative assessment of a sentencing practice which has been embraced by many First
Nation communities as a desirable community-based alternative to conventional criminal justice
processes.
182
Joseyounen, op cit, 183.
183
In February 1998 the Saskatchewan Department of Justice reported the criteria developed and
approved in Cheekinew, Joseyounen and Morin were “not used in the majority of cases”:
Saskatchewan Justice, op cit, 9-10. However, it is worth noting that the limited data on circle
sentencing cases contained in the report did not strictly support this conclusion. A review of 86
prosecution files of cases in which sentencing circles had been conducted revealed that the criteria had
been used in 15% of cases. With respect to the remaining cases the report observed that “it was not
known if criteria were used”: ibid, 9. While there appears to be insufficient data to substantiate the
contention, Saskatchewan Justice is clearly concerned that the rate of compliance with the criteria is
low, and that not all judges and communities have followed the criteria: author interview with David
Gullickson, Senior Policy Analyst, Policy, Planning and Evualtion Branch, Saskatchewan Justice,
Regina, 10 June 1998.

45
5.2 The Circle and the Sentencing Decision
The second key point of judicial discretion, an analysis of which is crucial to an
assessment of the nature of the decision-making process in circle sentencing, is the
judge’s ‘treatment’ of the recommendations or outcomes of the circle process. How
much freedom to determine sentence do communities enjoy via the practice of circle?
To express this inquiry a little differently: What is the ‘status’ of circle deliberations?
What role do sentencing circles play in sentencing decisions? Do circles merely
produce recommendations which the sentencing judge may accept or reject in his/her
complete discretion? Or have sentencing circles and the consensus of the circle
effectively replaced the conventional sentencing hearing and the judge’s opinion as
the primary sites of decision-making?
The first thing to note is that, in contrast to the question of which cases should
be considered eligible for circle sentencing, the question of the status of circle
deliberations and recommendations has attracted much less in the way of explicit ‘rule
setting’. In large part this is because the question of where the power is located yields,
at least formally, a simple answer: it is the judge and not the participants in the circle,
who has the ultimate decision-making authority. Courts of Appeal have reinforced
this principle in their appellate judgements.184 Yet, as Larry Chartrand has argued, “If
the judge is to give full respect to the aboriginal community, then his or her role must
… change from being the focus of attention and authority to one where he or she
largely concedes the decision-making authority to the community.”185 Is this
prescription for genuine and effective Aboriginal community participation in the
sentencing decision reconcilable with the principle of judge as ultimate decisionmaker? How have judges involved in circle sentencing attempted to reconcile these
apparently conflicting imperatives?
Reflecting the foundation principle of the judicial function, it is customary in
reports of cases involving sentencing circles for the judge to note that it is the judge
who must ultimately make the decision on what sentence is passed on the offender.
Having answered the threshold question in this way, it would be difficult and
potentially risky (from the point of perceptions of the judge’s integrity and of whether
s/he is appropriately acting within the bounds of judicial authority) for judges to
attempt to formulate ‘rules’ as to the decision-making aspects of sentencing circles;
and so they have not done so.
In assessing the ‘limits’ of sentencing circles in this respect, therefore, it is
necessary to consider the comments that judges have made in their judgements (as
well as in views express extra-judicially) and to look beyond the formal legal position
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to the position of law ‘in practice’, by examining the practical operation of circle
sentencing.
Immediately upon beginning to review the case law it becomes clear that the
formal legal position does not reveal the full picture. A number of judges involved in
circle sentencing have stated that the deliberations and recommendations of the
sentencing circle have, at a minimum, a substantial impact on the ultimate decision. In
R v SEH Stromberg-Stein J noted that
At the outset [of the sentencing circle] it was made clear that though the ultimate imposition
of sentence was my function, I would be aided and assisted by any recommendations made by
the circle. I would go further and say I would be and I am persuaded by the recommendations
made by the circle.
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In R v Naappaluk Dutil J observed in relation to his own experience establishing
(what he termed “consultation circles”):
As I see it, the judge’s role in a “consultation circle” is that of a discreet facilitator, who must
allow participants to express themselves.

… Of course, the judge is not bound by the recommendations of the participants in the
consultation. When I set up the consultation circles in Kangiqsujuaq, [an Inuit community in
northern Québec, in May 1994] … I clearly explained to all participants that I would not be
bound by their recommendations. It is understandable, however, that if the judge
systematically sets aside the circle’s recommendations, it may become entirely useless to hold
such sessions. In my opinion, the judge must listen to the participants, discuss with them if
need be, listen to their recommendations and follow them in most cases, unless he has serious
reasons to set them aside, in which case he must explain clearly the reasons for his decision,
so that the sessions are not looked upon as futile exercises.
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In reporting on the first circle in which he was involved, Dutil J also noted that at the
outset he “stressed the fact that, during the discussions, the members of the circle
should consider the judge to be their equal.”188
These judicial comments suggest that sentencing circle deliberations and
recommendations represent a great deal more than mere advice to the sentencing
judge. In this sense, it is erroneous to directly equate the status of a circle sentencing
consensus with the recommendations contained in a conventional pre-sentence report
186
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(a point which was recently confirmed by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R v
Taylor.189)
Yet it is clear that there is a degree of judicial sensitivity to the perception that
judges are effectively ‘handing over’ decision-making authority to the First Nation
communities generally, and the sentencing circle participants in particular. For
example, in Naappaluk, Dutil J concluded, somewhat inconsistently with his earlier
comments (quoted above), that at the final sentencing hearing (in the case at hand)
The Court will ask the members of the [community justice] committee for their suggestion as
to what sentence should be imposed. It will at no time feel bound by their recommendations.
The Court, while maintaining all its decision-making powers, will nevertheless listen to the
members of the committee with great interest.
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What this apparent inconsistency reveals is the inherent paradox of attempting to
reconcile First Nation communities’ aspirations for greater control over justice
administration with the legalities, formalities and conventions of the mainstream
criminal justice system. This paradox is particularly acute in the case of circle
sentencing which is an attempt to achieve the former without directly altering the
latter. It important that this basic tension not be ignored. Fafard J has explained:
… [I]n the end I’m the person who pronounces the sentence. At the moment, there is no legal
structure for sentencing circles as such. And there’s no use fooling people. When I sit down
with a sentencing circle, I say, “This is a process of empowerment. You’re empowered here to
have some input.” But that’s not the same thing as saying “You’re being empowered to
pronounce the sentence.” That would be lying to people and misleading them.
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Apart from this basic paradox, one of the problems which judges face is that,
given the novelty of circle sentencing, just as there is no formal legislative foundation
for the practice, there is no conventional judicial language to capture, in accurate and
appropriate terms, the nature of decision-making in cases where sentencing circles are
utilised. In R v Rich (No 2) O’Regan J attempted to convey the nature of decisionmaking in circle sentencing cases as follows: “By allowing community involvement
in the sentencing process the court is not losing its jurisdiction, control or power over
the accused. The fact is that the court, by using this process, merely shares its
control.”192
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This notion of ‘power sharing’ is apt to convey how the practice operates,
reflecting as it does the collaborative nature of the exercise as between the judge,
other court officers and the community. The notion of power sharing or partnership
between the judge and the community has been emphasised by a number of judges
involved in the development and implementation of sentencing circles.193 In R v
Nicholas, Desjardins J offered the following insight on the locus of control and
authority in sentencing circles:
It is very important that the judge be willing not only to convene the circle but to allow the
development of the circle to originate primarily from the community he or she must be
prepared to relinquish his or her mantel of power and control with only one exception: the
ultimate decision, and he or she should be prepared to adopt the decision of the circle so long
as it falls within the scope of a fit and proper sentence. If I had retained control of who
participated and the form of the process, the community participation would have been
perfunctory. By deferring to the community, allowing it to determine the participants and
details of process, I ensured that the process was driven by community choice and that the
community was truly willing to participate.
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This statement captures the potential of circle sentencing as a vehicle for shifting the
locus of decision-making authority. However, it does not, of itself, reveal whether the
power-sharing is substantive or merely procedural; symbolic or practically exercisable
by communities. Of course, no generalised answer can be given to this question.
Whether the potential for a shift in decision-making authority is realised depends on a
number of variables, most obviously, the willingness of judges and members of First
Nation communities to negotiate an appropriate system of power-sharing. The
examples of judicial views discussed above reveal that at least in the case of many of
the judicial proponents of the practice of circle sentencing, it is possible to detect an
implicit endorsement of a convention of substantial deference to the consensus an/or
recommendation that emerges from the circle. The existence of such an informal
convention is also reflected in the (relatively limited) available quantitative and
qualitative research data on the correlation between sentencing circle
recommendations and sentences imposed by judges.
Based on a study of the operation of circle sentencing and other forms of
community justice in Saskatchewan and Manitoba, Ross Green concluded that:
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... [C]ommunity members play a real part in the ultimate sentencing decision. Although the
judge possesses the legal right and obligation to impose sentence, in reality, the sentencing
decision is not always “made” by the judge. Of the sixty to seventy sentencing circles
conducted by Judge Fafard in northern Saskatchewan by the winter of 1994, he claimed never
to have rejected a circle consensus and believed that, as a result, community members were
enjoying a significant role in decision making at court: “[The community] may not have the
final say because I can’t give it to them, but I’m giving them a role in the decision-making
process and they’re genuinely getting to believe that, if it’s within reason, I won’t interfere
with it because I have never interfered with it. I’ve never had reason to disagree with a
[sentencing] recommendation.”
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Judge David Arnot, also of the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, has similarly
observed that while “the judge must be in agreement with the recommendation” of the
sentencing circle before s/he can impose a sentence in accordance with the
recommendation, it is “rare” for the judge not to accept the recommendation of the
community.196 Data contained in Saskatchewan Justice’s 1998 Aboriginal Justice
Strategy Interim Report,197 though inconclusive, also suggests a high correlation
between the recommendations of the sentencing circle and the sentence imposed by
the judge.198
In a 1996 review of community justice initiatives by the Teslin Tlingit First
Nation in the Yukon, Griffiths reported that “To date, 98% of all sentences handled by
community members in Teslin have fallen within the limits set by the [Territorial
Court of the Yukon].”199 Further, in a study of four models of community justice,200
Bazemore and Griffiths concluded that

195

Green, op cit, 74. See also Ross Green, “Aboriginal Community Sentencing and Mediation: Within
and Without the Circle” (1997) 25 Manitoba Law Journal 77 at 86-90.
196
Judge David Arnot, “Sentencing circles permit community healing”, National (October 1994) p 14.
197
Saskatchewan Justice, op cit.
198
In 52% of the 86 case files reviewed, it was “unknown” if the judge followed the circle’s
recommendation. The recommendation of the sentencing circle was followed in 36% of cases,
“followed somewhat” in 11% of cases. The judge did not follow the sentencing circle’s
recommendation in only 1% of cases: ibid, 10.
199
C Griffiths, op cit, 201. It is not clear whether the cases reviewed by Griffiths involved circle
sentencing specifically, or whether they included cases handled using other forms of community
sentencing, such as the practice of Teslin Tlingit clan leaders sitting with the judge to advise on
sentence, or the Teslin Tlingit Peacemaker Court (discussed above). Nonetheless, the findings are
significant in the present context. Also significant, in light of the suggestion made by some critics of
circle sentencing that the practice is concerned with achieving ‘lighter’ sentences for Aboriginal
offenders, is Griffiths’ explanation that: “Those sentences which have gone beyond the limits set by
the Territorial Court judge have been harsher than the sentence recommended by the prosecutor and/or
the judge”: ibid.
200
The four models reviewed are victim-offender mediation, family group conferencing, circle
sentencing, and a reparative probation program.

50
Circle Sentencing appears most advanced in an implicit continuum of the importance given to
the decisionmaking role of communities. ... Acting through the Community Justice
Committee, the community is clearly the “driver” in determining which offenders will be
admitted to the circle.
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While a definitive conclusion must await more comprehensive data collection and
evaluative research, the evidence available to date suggests that circle sentencing does
have the potential to significantly shift the locus of decision-making away from the
judge and the conventional justice administration system, and towards First Nations
communities; and that the process is, in many cases. being employed in a manner
which renders this shift in practical rather than merely symbolic terms.
The attitudes of appellate courts on the question of the status of sentencing
circle recommendations must also be taken into account. As discussed earlier,
appellate court judges have, on the whole, strongly endorsed the conventional view
that ultimate decision-making authority remains with the judge. At the same, a Court
of Appeal has only once upheld a Crown appeal against a sentence imposed in
accordance with the recommendation of a sentencing circle.202 In addition, there is
some support—most notably in the judgements of Bayda CJ of the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal—for recognition of a more substantial decision-making function
legitimately exercisable by sentencing circle participants.
In his dissenting judgement in Morin Bayda CJ attempted to lay out a set of
guidelines to assist sentencing judges in determining the weight to be given to the
circle’s deliberations and recommendations, or as the Chief Justice more accurately
put it, the “legal effect of a sentencing circle’s conclusion”.203 These guidelines take
the form of two questions which, in the view of the Chief Justice, the judge should ask
herself/himself at the end of the sentencing circle.
The first is this: After hearing what took place in the sentencing circle and keeping in mind
the two prerequisites, as well as the other factors I considered in deciding whether a
sentencing circle should be held, am I still satisfied that the restorative approach is the right
approach in this case? … [If the answer is no] … the judge will revert to the ordinary
approach and impose a fit sentence according to the usual norms that apply when that
approach is used. In that case the sentence circle proceedings would serve the same purpose
201
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as a sentencing hearing would serve where an ordinary approach is used. On the other hand,
where the judge answers the first question, “yes …”, he or she should ask the second
question: Would the recommendations by the sentencing circle, if accepted, constitute a fit
sentence … in the restorative sense? … If the answer to the question is “yes” then with one
exception that end the matter but for the imposition of sentence. … If the answer is an
unequivocal “no”, the judge ought not to impose a restorative sentence which involves the
community in a way it did not expect or want to be involved. The imposition of such a
sentence upon an unwilling offender and involving an unwilling community would likely
seriously undermine the chances of success of the restorative component. The central purpose
of the restorative approach would be lost. The judge’s best recourse in that situation would be
to revert to the ordinary process and impose a sentence accordingly.
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Given the uncertainty and controversy surrounding the relationship between the
recommendation of the sentencing circle and the sentence ultimately handed down by
the judge, Bayda CJ’s attempt to outline a way of navigating the ‘fine line’ between
meaningful community participation in, and the judge’s formal authority over, the
sentencing decision is noteworthy. However, the practical utility of the guidelines
provided by Bayda CJ may be weakened by their complexity and lack of precision. A
great deal is still left to the judge’s discretion, particularly the threshold question
regarding the appropriateness of a ‘restorative approach’ in any given case. Of more
direct relevance to the question of the locus of decision-making authority in cases
where a sentencing circle is convened is the ambiguity of Bayda CJ’s approach where
the judge answers the second question in the negative. On the one hand, the
recommendation that in such a situation the judge should abandon the restorative
approach and impose a sentence according to ordinary principles appears to reinforce
the conventional notion that, in practice, only those outcomes recommended by the
circle that fall within the parameters of a ‘fit’ sentence set by the judge will be
endorsed by the judge. On the other hand, it is implicit in Bayda CJ’s recommended
approach to such situations that the sentencing circle should have primary ownership
of any sentence which is based on restorative principles, so that if the judge is of the
view that the sentence recommended by the circle is not a fit sentence, s/he must not
simply reject the recommendation but must also reject the restorative approach
altogether. This ‘all or nothing’ approach is somewhat curious, but is does have the
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virtue of allowing for a fairly clear distinction between cases in which a restorative
justice approach has been adopted and cases where it has not.
Further support for the view that the deliberations and recommendations of the
circle can legitimately be seen (and, indeed, should be seen) as central to the
sentencing decision-making process, rather than mere advice to the sentencing judge,
can be found in Bayda CJ’s majority judgement in R v Taylor.205 In this case the Court
of Appeal held that the sentencing judge made numerous errors in the establishment
and conduct of the sentencing circle. Despite these errors the Crown appeal against
sentence was dismissed because the judge had ultimately deferred to the view of the
sentencing circle, the participants in which, by their proper consideration of the issues
had effectively ‘remedied’ the process which had been flawed by the judge’s errors.
Bayda CJ stated that
In the end, the validity of the process was saved by the attitude, conduct, and thinking of the
circle participants who were the principal authors and creators of the sentence which the trial
judge approved and adopted as his own. Accordingly, the recommendations of the sentencing
circle have a distinct and important role to play in any assessment of the fitness of the
sentence.
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In Taylor, Bayda CJ approved of the circle playing the primary decisionmaking role. Even if this characterisation of the respective decision-making roles of
the judge and the other circle participants is considered as exceptional, reflecting the
particular and arguable atypical procedural facts of the case, the decision in Taylor
stands as an important judicial endorsement of the view that sentencing circle
participants can legitimately play a key role in the decision on sentence. This suggests
that circle sentencing does provide for a significant shift in the locus of decisionmaking authority from the judge to the community. This conclusion is also supported
by the (admittedly limited) evidence which is currently available on the weight and
status afforded to sentencing circle recommendations by sentencing judges.

6. A STATUTORY FOUNDATION FOR CIRCLE SENTENCING?
One of the most distinctive features of the development of circle sentencing is that it
has occurred at the community level — commonly as a ‘joint venture’ between circuit
court judges and First Nation communities — and not as part of a government-
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sponsored law reform initiative. As Judge Barry Stuart has noted, with specific
reference to the development of circle sentencing in the Yukon:
From the outset, until now, the Yukon Community Circle process, in shifting the sentencing
process from courts to communities, from a right-based adversarial process to an interestbased consensus process, and from an exclusive professional ownership to a shared
community-based partnership has been carried out without changes to legislation, to
administrative or financial arrangements, and without co-ordinated support from justice
agencies. It has evolved on its own momentum.
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These origins are both a strength and a weakness of circle sentencing. On the
one hand, the emergence of circle sentencing at a distance from executive government
and without a formal legislative framework has allowed the practice to emerge and
take shape largely free of the potentially stifling influence of government policy
considerations and in a manner adapted to the particular needs of the community,
rather than in conformity with a grand legislative scheme. On the other hand circle
sentencing is vulnerable to the extent that, having no formally recognised authority in
its own right, it relies for its survival on judicial goodwill (including the capacity of
the judge to build a relationship of trust with the community),208 community
motivation and resources, and the support of justice system professionals. As Larry
Chartrand has observed, until such time as there is a clear legislative basis for
Aboriginal community decision-making in relation to sentencing, or more broadly in
relation to justice administration,209 then “the extent to which the circle sentencing
process will be a vehicle for true community input in the decision-making process is
up to the judge.”210
It may be suggested that s 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, introduced in 1996
as part of a codification of sentencing principles,211 provides such a statutory
foundation. Section 718.2(e) provides that one of the principles which a judge must
take into account when sentencing an offender is “all available sanctions other than
imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all
offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders”.212
207

Stuart (1997), op cit, 113.
See Barnett, op cit, 3-4. Judge Linton Smith has emphasised the importance of this trust relationship
in light of his experience with sentencing circles on circuit in southern Saskatchewan communities:
author interview with Judge Linton Smith, Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, Regina, 10 June 1998.
209
Chartrand has argued that “Legislation by aboriginal governments, under the inherent right to
control social order within their communities, or by the Federal government, is the desired response”:
Chartrand, op cit, 880, n 12.
210
Ibid, 880.
211
See Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46, Part XXIII (came into force on 3 September 1996).
212
Emphasis added. Other principles expressed in the legislation include proportionality (s 718.1), due
regard to aggravating or mitigating factors (s 718.2(a)), parity (s 718.2(b)), avoidance of undue length
208

54
In R v Wells213 the Alberta Court of Appeal held that in accordance with s
718.2(e) sentencing judges are required to take into account unique considerations
relevant to Aboriginal offenders not just with respect to sentencing outcomes or
alternative dispositions, but also with respect to sentencing decision-making
processes.214 The Court ruled that judges must consider
… not only social factors particular to aboriginal Canadians but as well the fact that within the
aboriginal community alternative approaches to sanctions, including such things as sentencing
circles and input from tribal elders, are being developed.
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In R v Gladue216 the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the unique
circumstances of Aboriginal people that sentencing judges were required to take into
account in fulfillment of the “remedial role”217 imposed on them by Part XXIII of the
Criminal Code, and s 718.2(e) in particular,218 included both the processes and
outcomes of sentencing:
The background considerations regarding the distinct situation of aboriginal people in Canada
encompass a wide range of unique circumstances, including most particularly:
(A)

The unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in
bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the courts; and

or harshness where consecutive sentences imposed (s 718.2(c), and incarceration as a last resort (s
718.2(d)).
213
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(B)

The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the
circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or
connection.
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With respect to the adoption of appropriate sentencing procedures and sanctions the
Court held that s 718.2(e) required sentencing judges to respond to the fact that
Aboriginal people hold “different conceptions of appropriate sentencing procedures
and sanctions” and that “the traditional sentencing ideals of deterrence, separation,
and denunciation are often far removed from the understanding of sentencing held by
… [Aboriginal] offenders and their community.”220 Specifically, s 718.2(e), along with
other provisions of Part XXIII of the Criminal Code,221 requires judges to consider the
appropriate application of restorative justice principles,222 particularly for Aboriginal
offenders given that “most traditional aboriginal conceptions of sentencing place
primary emphasis upon the ideals of restorative justice.”223
In a number of respects Gladue is a useful and welcome judicial articulation of
the significance of s 718.2(e) for the treatment of Aboriginal people in the Canadian
criminal justice system. Of particular significance is the Supreme Court of Canada’s
endorsement of restorative justice sentencing principles, its designation of s 718.2(e)
as an attempt to remedy the injustice and over-representation over Aboriginal people
in the criminal justice system, and its clear statement that sentencing judges have a
duty224 to consider the unique circumstances of all Aboriginal offenders.225
However, there is little in the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment to support
the characterisation of s 718.2(e) as a firm legislative foundation for communitybased decision-making processes like circle sentencing. In articulating the practical
219
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implications of the requirement imposed on judges by s 718.2(e) to consider
appropriate sentencing procedures and sanctions, the Court focused on “the
importance of community-based sanctions”.226 The only active role in the
determination of sanctions for Aboriginal community members to which explicit
reference was made by the Court was as potential providers of information who might
be called on to make the judge “aware of alternatives to incarceration that exist
whether inside or outside the aboriginal community of the particular offender.”227 The
Court stated that “Beyond the use of the pre-sentence report, the sentencing judge
may and should in appropriate circumstances and where practicable request that
witnesses be called who may testify as to reasonable alternatives.”228 This information
“may come from representations of the relevant aboriginal community which will
usually be that of the offender.”229
It would be unwise to read too much into this aspect of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Gladue. The case was not one in which the sentence had been
determined via a sentencing circle or any other form of community-based procedure.
Consequently, the issue of the relationship between circle sentencing and s 718.2(e) of
the Criminal Code was not squarely before the Court. Certainly, there is nothing in the
judgment that raises any doubts about the legitimacy of the practice of sentencing
circle. The only mention of the practice by the Court took the form of an aside that it
was “unnecessary to engage here in an extensive discussion of the relatively recent
evolution of innovative sentencing practices, such as healing and sentencing circles,
and aboriginal community councils”.230 However, the Supreme Court of Canada’s
narrow characterisation of the role of Aboriginal communities in the fulfillment of the
objectives of Part XXIII and s 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, suggests that it is
unlikely that s 718.2(e) will be interpreted as providing a solid legislative foundation
for circle sentencing, including active participation by community members as
decision-makers rather than simply as sources of information or providers of
alternative sentencing dispositions.231 To the extent that s 718.2(e) is an example of the
Parliament ‘catching up’ with the initiation of circle sentencing and other forms of
community-based justice administration, the legislation ventures only a short distance
down the path already established by judges and First Nation communities.
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7. CONCLUSION
Drawing on the analytical perspective of legal pluralism, this article has examined the
significance of circle sentencing as a step towards increased First Nation community
decision-making authority in relation to the administration of justice. On the face of it,
and in light of the established rules, criteria and guidelines, the locus of authority
appears to have shifted little. However, on closer inspection, this article has revealed
that the use of sentencing circle has the potential to be (and in a number of
communities has proved to be) considerably more than a token gesture in the direction
of recognising Aboriginal law and justice values and mechanisms for dealing with
wrongdoing. If the practice of circle sentencing has its foundation in the community,
and provided there is a genuine willingness on the part of the judge (and other key
players, including the Crown and defence counsel232) to share power and control with
respect to the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders, then circle sentencing can constitute
an important shift in the locus of decision-making authority.
The fundamental principle that the judge must make the ultimate decision on
sentence has not proved to be as significant a brake on community decision-making
authority as might be assumed. There is considerable variation across the country in
terms of judicial perceptions of the status of circle deliberations and
recommendations, but a convention of respect for, and deference to, the views of the
sentencing circle has been adopted by a number of judges. Circle sentencing appears
most likely to ‘work’ where it is based on a recognition that sentencing by the
offender’s community is both a more appropriate and, potentially, more effective
method of decision-making than conventional judicial sentencing. In this way circle
sentencing is founded on a recognition and appreciation of the existence of two (or
more) normative orders operating simultaneously, centred on the conventional
criminal justice system and the First Nation community respectively. Therefore,
notwithstanding the formal constraints under which circle sentencing operates, the
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practice of circle sentencing can be seen as a manifestation of legal pluralism in both
the social/empirical and legal/juridical senses outlined above.
In making this observation it is important not to overstate the pluralist
credentials of circle sentencing. To speak of circle sentencing as involving an
acknowledgement of legal pluralism as both an empirical reality and a desirable
justice reform aspiration is not to prematurely offer the Canadian justice system
‘absolution’ or a post-colonial ‘clean bill of health’. The practice of circle sentencing
cannot, of itself, be considered to remedy the myriad deficiencies of the mainstream
criminal justice system which impact adversely on Aboriginal communities,233 let
alone satisfy the aspirations of Aboriginal people for self-government in the area of
justice administration. However, given its capacity to shift important dimensions of
justice administration decision-making authority from the mainstream courts to First
Nation communities, circle sentencing points to the viability and desirability of the
adoption of pluralism and autonomy as foundational principles for Aboriginal justice
reform.
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